

LIVING BEING IN TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
AND IN FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY

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1. Introductory Remarks

The paper I am offering today is meant as a first essay in a project that has been growing of my studies and seminars in phenomenology over the past ten years or so. The effort focuses on one of the central themes in twentieth century phenomenology virtually from its very beginnings in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, namely, living being, a theme which, of course, has antecedents earlier than Husserl. After the more distant philosophic and scientific developments that characterize the modern period—from 1600 on, a turning point signaled by the names of Galileo and Descartes, with the consequent sharp dichotomy that resulted between spirit- or mental-being on the one hand and material or quantitative being on the other—here the more immediate antecedents to name are principally Charles Darwin and Wilhelm Dilthey. Of course neither of these intellectual giants was without intellectual forbears and developmental context, but theirs is the work respectively that brought the theme of life and living into fundamental centrality for the study of humanity and the natural world, a centrality all the more recognized by the work of the twentieth century. More can be said about that as we proceed, but I wish right now simply to name this theme, *living being*, and to make some points of general orientation about how it has been thematized and treated as the setting for the problematic I wish to develop within the focus on Husserl and Heidegger.

How in specifics Husserl or Heidegger treat life or living being will be taken up in the body of my paper. At this point, let us simply admit that each does indeed early on take being human as basically a *process*, an *on-going*, rather than as a fixed entitative substance. They take it up differently, of course, but in each case life is in evidence as a coming-about in process, not as a mere static consolidation in thing-like substance. How Husserl and Heidegger's conceptions do or do not come to terms with the analysis of life as done in biological science remains also to be seen, but in each case Husserl's and Heidegger's focus on life works within a suspension, done differently in each case, of the naturalizing and objectifying that is methodologically in play in natural science.

This opens up a pivotal programmatic point. The "suspension" just named—an "epoché" of a kind in each case—puts an effort of *radicalization* in play that is meant, not only to aim at the categorizations and procedures of natural science, but at the very findings that Husserl and Heidegger themselves

make in the course of their work. The radicalization, in other words, imposes also a move self-critical reconsideration, the recognition of the need to overcome presuppositional naïvetés and clear up conceptual obscurities of every kind even in their own work. And this radicalization aims ultimately and above all else at elucidating one overarching question: How for Husserl consciousness and experience of the world and for Heidegger how human being's very being as human *come about*. How do these occurrences that in each case are human being *originate*? I shall not attempt to sketch their respective answers to this question, but I want to make sure we do not forget that it is central to each.

The way I wish to follow Husserl's and Heidegger's respective paths of thought, now, is by studying the extent to which each sees this occurring of human being to be *precisely as living* being. And more specifically, I want to ask if the way in which they work this does or does not get radically beyond, or beneath, the still reigning modern-period dichotomy between "*nature*" and "*spirit*." In other words, to what extent does the radicalization each pursues overcome or undercut the reigning split between Cartesian "mental being and doing" and Galilean "quantitative being and process," or not?

You may well ask, Well, why *need* it there be a radicalization that overcomes or undercuts that split? And my answer is: It doesn't take much to see the conflicts that are so rampant between the work of the so-called natural sciences and that of the so-called human sciences, nor to notice how often attempts at reconciliation lead to failure, resulting in recourse to the inexplicable or in simply conceding to the reductionism of realities asserted on one side of the dichotomy to those asserted on the other. I need only mention the frustrations, dead ends, and disconnections that "consciousness science" is experiencing, after the dozen years or more of the Santa Fe meetings and fourteen volumes of the *Journal of Consciousness Studies*. Moreover, I think we find it was a point and purpose in the agendas of each Husserl and Heidegger to overcome this kind of dichotomy, or at least to get beyond it, and that their work in each case was meant to show how it ought to be done.

Let me take up the two thinkers' programs one at a time to see what they may offer on the matter.

2. Husserl

In one sense it would be an exaggeration to say that the *Logical Investigations* focuses on life; for in fact it focuses on *consciousness*. At the same time it would be an even wilder exaggeration to say that Husserl finds life a pivotal characterization of consciousness only later in his career when he begins to write the "Crisis"-texts. It is not that Husserl takes it for granted that consciousness is a kind of life, as if he pays no attention to that idea, but rather that the display of living as the movement of consciousness is built right into the very analytic description he makes of it in his phenomenology. There

are two ways in which this display of a “going-on,” of a performance, that can in principle be termed living is something that is central to Husserl’s phenomenology, even if they were not always present together in his published works to an equally detailed extent.

The first of these is omnipresent in the *Logical Investigations*, as a matter of the habitual terminology Husserl uses to denominate the sphere of investiganda he is concerned with. The fact is known by everyone that Husserl introduces and develops his conception of the intentionality of consciousness in the *Logical Investigations*, but we have to emphasize the way it is intrinsic to the mutual interweaving of *two context-issues*: namely, on the one hand how the *logic* that regulates the rationality of our conceptions is autonomous and sui generis—“ideal”—in its character and irreducible to any naturalist reduction, and on the other how the *consciousness*, by which we bring in the logical to understand and express conceptually that which we find around us in the world, is bound to that same world by the *intentionality* that opens us up to it in a fundamental dimension of our being. Finally, in the *Logical Investigations* Husserl defers until “Investigation 5” his analysis of this intentionality basic to human experience and to any meaning-framing articulation of experience; and here is where the master term used throughout for this second context for the understanding of the first context, logic, namely, the term ‘*Erlebnis*’—“experience, something that is *erlebt*, something that one witnesses oneself or goes through as it happens,” is reserved precisely for the intentional event in human conscious dealings with the world.

Thus in the “Introduction” to Volume Two of the *Logical Investigations* Husserl makes clear that valid “logical concepts” “must arise by ideating abstraction on the basis of certain *Erlebnisse*, “experiences,” a term perfectly correct in implying that we “go through” events as we are aware of them, but in which at this point Husserl does not emphasize or even consider the connotation that consciously “going through” events *is* our *living* them.¹ The term ‘*Erlebnis*—experience’ gets specified precisely as *intentional* in the beginning of “Investigation 5.” I wish to cite the opening paragraph of this Investigation, but to do so, let me first comment on the term he uses here, ‘*Spezies*.’ It is in “Investigation I” that he himself makes this clear, and that is what I wish to draw from in my comment.² *Spezies* is the term for the unitary meaning” meant in the many instances in which one talks about some same ideal gener-

¹ See *Logische Untersuchungen* Vol II. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1913 and 1968; hereafter LU II), §2, p. 5. No changes from the 1900-01 edition were made in this passage. The term *Erlebnis* used quite freely in the sense just specified is completely accepted unrevised.

² The explication here is drawn from §§32-33.

ality. For example, the number 4 can be meant in thinking it and expressing it as “the second even number in the number-series,” as the square of 2,” and so forth; in other words, the same universal meaning is a *Spezies* that can be held in mind (*vorgestellt*) in different particularizations of its sense (*Vorstellungen*). With this in mind, here is Husserl’s opening of “Investigation V”:

In our Second Investigation we clarified in a general way the sense of the ideality of the species [*Spezies*], and, together with that, the sense [*Sinn*] of the ideality of the meanings [*Bedeutungen*] that is taken up for consideration in pure logic. As with all ideal unities what corresponds to these meanings [*Bedeutungen*] are real possibilities [*reale Möglichkeiten*] and individual cases of actualities [*eventuell Wirklichkeiten*], <and> what corresponds *in specie* to these meanings are <as well> the *acts* of meaning [*die Akte des Beudeutens*] in which those meanings are nothing other than ideally apprehended non-independent parts [*Momente*]. New questions now arise regarding the kind of psychic experiences [*psychischen Erlebnissen*] in which the highest kind of meaning [*Bedeuten*] has its origin, and likewise regarding the lower sorts of the experiences in which essentially different sorts of meanings unfold.³

As Husserl very quickly explains in the very next paragraph, and then in more detail in the second chapter of this investigation (§§10 and 13), these “experiences” are called “acts” because in each case there is a factor of actual meaning, an outwardly aimed structural opening beyond one’s own constitutive make-up to what is *other* to it, that is the essential element of “intentionality”:

These experiences that mean are to be <taken as> “acts,” and what is meaningful in each such individual act will lie right in the “*act-experience*” and not in its object; it will lie in that which makes the act into an ‘*intentional*’ experience, an experience “*directed*” to an object.⁴

Husserl will insist that the “intentionality” of these “act-experiences” is not an actual *action*, a genuine *doing* of something—and certainly not a deliberate doing.⁵ Intentionality is a *structural “relation,”* an essential constitutively structural factor, not something that is effectuated in continual explicit exercise by an individual subject.

Such, then, is the first of the two ways in which consciousness in being analyzed in phenomenology can be spoken of as *living*, but what we have so far, the intentional bond, is *not a movement*, not a “going-on” in the sense of a continuing process. Just how “intentionality,” despite being static in its de-

³ LU II, “Einleitung,” p. 343.

⁴ LU II, “Einleitung,” p. 344, my supplementation in angle-brackets.

⁵ See §§10 and 13.

lineation so far, is ipso facto a factor of *life* remains to be made clear, yet, preliminarily, we can say this: to the extent that experiential awareness is a factor not of rocks and hills and trees but of what are termed *animals*—and at least (but perhaps not exclusively) with respect to what are called the higher class of vertebrates—and to the extent that experiential awareness is ipso facto *intentional*, to that extent intentionality is essentially a feature of the living.⁶ No treatment of this sort, however, enters into the *Logical Investigations*. Here, where the intentionality of perceptual experience is explicitly *not* being analyzed as a moving action, and where it is specifically as the *intentional relation* that in an “act” is termed an *experience*, *Erlebnis*, another feature of consciousness that *is* a genuine *movement* will be the “going-on” wherein the intentional relation both lives and gains its concrete meaningfulness.

Here, then, is where the fundamental “going-on” of *temporality* is spoken of, with all that it makes happen in experience, namely, the coherence of sense in what I “go through” in the course of continuing experience wherein alone, and in as much as I am aware in some definite way of that coherent sense, I can be said to *live* in that “going-on.” Let me just mention two places in the *Logical Investigations* where this is clearly in play, despite the fact that the phenomenological analysis of temporality only gets done after the first edition of this work, between 1901 and 1910. The analysis of temporality is returned to by Husserl in 1917-1918 and again in 1929-1934, with a deepening each time even in the fact of serious methodological questions that came to light.⁷

Now, however, we must look at a simpler matter in the two texts of the *Logical Investigations* to note here. In the first text, from near the very end of “Investigation 1,” the sense of *Erlebnis* as indicative of the kind of “going-on” that is in play comes through. In speaking of the structure of actually *meaning* something, in this case some “unitary meaning [*Bedeutung*]”—let us say “red,” Husserl’s own example—he delineates the way in that actual experience there is an individually determinate intensive factor in the experience itself that corresponds to the individual red—say dark red—as which some object one is calling red is perceived. (This, of course, is what in *Ideas I* is named the noetic correlate to

⁶ As will be point out below, in addition to occasional remarks in *Ideas I*, when Husserl works out *Ideas II* it is clear that animal life cannot be simply dealt with in terms that exclude *sensitivity* and the way this becomes an incipient perceptual experience in a measure that needs clarification.

⁷ This is the history of the assignment by Husserl of Eugen Fink to edit Husserl’s time-analysis manuscripts, in the course of which Fink saw the extreme acuity of methodological issues. The extent to which Fink laid these issues out for Husserl is not clear. See my *Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), Chapter 5.

the noematic “moment.” In *Logical Investigations* this distinction is characterized differently, but let’s leave that aside here.) Husserl then writes: “When we carry out this act and as it were live in it (*und leben wir gleichsam in ihm*), we of course mean the act’s object and not its meaning [*Bedeutung*].”⁸ Husserl’s point here is that it is not the determinate factor of the *intending* that is correlative to the feature intended in an object that one is aiming at in the experience, but the *intended* object itself, in terms of *its* specific, concrete—in this case—red color; but in emphasizing this point, and in including the performances that I may perform—doing the perceiving, talking about what we perceive, etc.—he is necessarily talking about the actual going on of my own real being; and that is clearly characterized as a living kind of being, even if qualified by the “as it were [*gleichsam*]” which I take to imply that the living here is to be taken *not* as that of naturalistic biology but precisely as the life of *intentional engagement* with what is around me. It is a kind of life that has yet to be made clear in phenomenology.

How that might be done, however, is indicated—again with a minimum of elaboration—in the second text I want to refer to, §6 in “Investigation 5,” where Husserl, adapting Descartes’ famous, to many infamous, *Cogito, ergo sum*, elaborates on how the “insight” Descartes was so taken by has to be dealt with quite differently than Descartes does, namely, in terms of the intentionality of consciousness. Departing from Descartes, he in no way attributes the evidentness of one’s own existing to my being the object of an explicit intentional focus. Even the judgment that I might make—à la cartésienne—that I exist is evident not because I am focusing on myself, but because something is going on as incontrovertibly evident *as* I utter the judgment, not *because* of it. The “destiny of this judgment *I am*” is “evident only in the living intention that cannot be adequately communicated in words.”⁹ A great part of what is going on here is the fact of the *continuity and coherence* of that which I am perceiving, and as much of *that which I am* in the perceiving of it. There is a “unity of coexistence” in both facets of the intentional unit, namely, the intending consciousness and the intended object. And in a formula that is rather crude in relation to what will soon be a far more articulated analysis of temporal synthesis, this persistence of unity in a continuous streaming of experience is indicated as in play by virtue of “the

⁸ LU II, Unt. 1, §24, p. 103. Let me note here that the sentence begins with a perfectly ordinary word that will later become more important, *vollziehen*—carry out or perform: “Vollziehen wir den Akt, und leben wir gleichsam in ihm, so meinen wir natürlich seinen Gegenstand und nicht seiner Bedeutung.“

⁹ LU II, Unt. V, §6, p. 357.

presentive from [*Darstellungsform*] of time that belongs immanently to the flow of consciousness as temporally appearing unity . . .”¹⁰

These are just two indications of the kind one can repeatedly see in Husserl’s subsequent phenomenology. Both kinds of indication in the end, however, really relate to one point: that the life of the subjective is the temporalizing dynamic of intentionality itself, and this entire dynamic is the structure that constitutes most essentially (if one may use such a phrase!) *conscious experience as such*. It can be no surprise, then, that that Husserl in his phenomenology will turn to analyzing this core structure of temporally structured intentional experience in the almost never-ending detailings that its constituents require. All the same, the history of Husserl’s labors may well show serious limits to the analysis of this living intentional temporality; especially if one feels it necessary, as I do, to consider the adequacy of that effort within the context of the distinction between “nature” and “spirit,” precisely on the question of the meaning of “the living.”

On this very issue of “the living,” then, there are two fundamental factors in the matters that the materials we have reviewed have spoken of that are central: a) the full structure and process of the temporally constitutive stream as such, and b) whether or not the “going on” of this temporal structure and process in its two features of “intentionality” and “temporal flow” is all that is needed for it to qualify as *living being*, for human being, without having to take into consideration the kind of *non-human* life that, found all around us, must quite manifestly be called living *for other reasons*, namely because of the material organic processes that constitute their life. It goes without saying, too, that it certainly appears that material organic life goes on *within us* as well.

On the first factor: One has to recognize that Husserl’s analysis of the temporal “going-on” of “living being,” the process by which coherence and continuity is constituted for both the life of the intentional conscious subject and the objects and world that it intentionally experiences, was never put into final form; it remains a series of three sets of manuscripts each worked out in a different stage of development and on a different level of the process in question. Of these three sets the first, from 1904 to 1910 (but edited with portions of the second set from 1917-18)¹¹ was the only one published in

¹⁰ LU II, Unt. V, §6, p. 359.

¹¹ See the indications given in Hua XXXIII, “Einleitung der Herausgeber,” pp. XVII and XXV and in “Zur Textgestaltung,” p. 393.

Husserl's lifetime, with the other two coming out long after his death, that is, only in 2001 and 2006.¹² The only attempt at consolidation and integration of this series of manuscripts was attempted at Husserl's request by Eugen Fink from 1929 to 1935, but no one else has ever read the resulting book manuscript, including Husserl, and in Fink's last years he appears to have destroyed it. Here, today, I'm afraid I shall have to leave aside consideration of the whole temporality question.

As to the second consideration, whether human life is or is not in constitution materially organic as well as intentional-and-temporally on-going, the question brings us directly to the theme of "nature and spirit [*Natur und Geist*]." For it certainly seems that material and organic life is, in an irremovable way, genuinely an integral part of the *nature* we find all around us and within us, however one defines nature and whether it is capitalized or not—Nature or nature. Here, too, differently than in the case of his analysis of temporality, Husserl returned again and again to the issue of "nature and spirit" in his lecture courses, and, as we all know, devoted his final publication effort to an elaboration of the issue of "nature and spirit" in terms of his descriptive analysis of the "life world [*die Lebenswelt*]" as a basis for explicating transcendental constitutive subjectivity. Even there, however, and, so far as I know throughout his many treatments of "nature and spirit," he never really thematically explicated, basically and integrally, just what *life as such* must finally be on the basis of his phenomenology—however much essential points for that are found throughout his writings.

Let us take up briefly how the elements of intentional life are investigated in terms of the factors and structures of human perception as humans go about engaging experientially with the world, whether they do or do not face the issue of how they are materially and organically *natural*. One way to lead into this question is to link the not infrequent mention in *Ideas I* of animals as conscious beings to the more extended study of the structure of animal being as "psychophysical" in *Ideas II*, where the focus is on the full-scale constitutive whole of human being precisely as "psychophysical"—or, more accurately, as a "layered" body-soul-spirit/person composite.¹³ This is a huge topic, and I make no pre-

¹² The first of these two sets, edited by Rudolf Bernet and Dieter Lohmar, was published in 2001 by Kluwer Verlag (Dordrecht/Boston/London) as *Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/18)*, Husserliana XXXIII, The second set, edited by Dieter Lohmar, was published in 2006 by Springer (Dordrecht) as *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929-1934): Die C-Manuskripte*, Husserliana Dokumente VIII,.

¹³ It is not all that clear what the difference might be between "person" and "spirit." Formulations where things are said of one seem in principle equally said of the other, such as the following: 1) from §50—"As person, I am what I am . . . as *subject of a surrounding world (Umwelt)*. The concepts of I and surrounding world are

tensions of covering it in any adequacy. I want, rather, as compactly as possible, to point out the line of the inquiry that Husserl makes and how it contributes to the question the issue, namely, whether the dichotomy of nature and spirit is fundamental and irreducible, or phenomenologically naïve and preliminary however strong its traditional status may be.

The main issue here is this: In *Ideas I* animals and humans share some same features, specifically “psychophysicality,”¹⁴ which is often enough said in other ways—e.g., that both humans and animals are conscious or experiential beings and that both are at least a kind of “I-subject.”¹⁵ At the same time both are in fact “animals” and both are “beings of nature.”¹⁶ These points are usually explicitly identified as “natural attitude” convictions, all of which get set aside by the transcendental reflection to be put into play by the epoché and reduction as non-applicable to the transcendental subjectivity to be reached in the findings regarding constitution-working processes and structures. But then as Husserl in *Ideas Book II* develops his “studies in the phenomenology of constitution,” as that book’s subtitle puts it,¹⁷ these different elements of the “natural attitude” conception of human being that are shared with animals become, not just features attributed to human being because of naïve conceptions, but *factors for the very functioning* of the *transcendental operations* that are in play in human conscious life to

related to one another inseparably.” 2) from §61)–“Spirits are the subjects that accomplish cogitations . . . *Spirit* is not an abstract I of position-taking acts but is the *fullness* of the person, the *I as human*, the ‘I take a position,’ the ‘I think, I value, I act, I complete works, etc.’” (Pp. 184 and 292-93 respectively.) In the end, too, the concept of “spirit” tends to take on a transcendental connotation: “The spirit is determined through its surrounding world, and it even has a natural regulation insofar as it manifests dependencies of various kinds once it is placed in relation to nature constituted with reference to the personal world. But this does not prevent its being *absolute, irrelative*.” (§64, p. 301) The renderings here are (with minor modifications) from the English translation by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer, *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, Edmund Husserl, Collected Works, Vol. III, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989..

¹⁴ *Ideas I*, pp. 8, 70, and 106,

¹⁵ Op. cit., respectively pp. 58, 69, and 318; p. 63.

¹⁶ Ob. cit., pp. 116, 157, and 175.

¹⁷ This is not Husserl’s subtitle, but it is close in import to a text the editor of *Hua IV*, Marly Biemel, cites in her “Einleitung.” It is actually from the first section of Husserl’s first draft of *Ideas II*, written out by hand in 1912 right after finishing the manuscript of *Ideas I* (See *Hua V*, p. 164.) The text reads: One should add that this text goes further than what Husserl announces for *Bk II* in his “Introduction” to *Ideas I*, p. 5.

constitute the way things in the world can appear for human intentionality. In other words, transcendental constitution is delineated in its operation in terms of basically *natural attitude conceptions* of the human make-up, even if these are thus described in non-scientific terms. Here, for example, Husserl distinguishes the *motivation* of psychological processes from the causality of physics or chemistry, or he always names the human body *Leib* (living body) in distinction from *Körper* (physical object body), or, finally and especially, he non-reductively binds “soul”-operations to living-body (*Leib*) operations such as the kinesthesia-based centering of experience in oneself. This in itself is tremendously important inasmuch as it is a definite self-awareness that is non-thematic, that is *felt* in its meaningfulness as it is going on rather than by any kind of explicit, thematic “turn back” upon oneself, as in cognitive self-*reflection*. Yet nothing else is given to *define* these features as now transcendental against the “natural-attitude” originals with which they share so much—*except* that these features are never spoken of in neurological or organic or chemical terms, but exclusively in *experiential* terms. And yet, since “experience” is an ambiguous term—seemingly at one time a natural-attitude term and at others transcendental—it is as if one has in fact moved to the transcendental seamlessly from the natural, drawing basic conceptions from it for the transcendental. Otherwise put, there is no clarification of how *human* perceptual experience—i.e., human *aesthesis*—turns into *transcendentally constituting* experience—i.e., a transcendental aesthetic.

One could indeed say, as Husserl sometimes himself does (but not in *Ideas II*), that these descriptions, astute as they may be, are not *ipso facto* transcendental. The analyses are far more an elaboration of a *phenomenological psychology* than they are “transcendental” in the sense of the level of accounting on which structures or processes being described are intrinsically not *placed and found within the world*. This is something that becomes a bit clearer in the “Crisis”-writings. In contrast, what seems to count in *Ideas II* as constituting factors are one and all features of an intrinsically “in-the-world” being, not a *world-preceding and constitutively world-originating* transcendental Something. I shall say more about this shortly.

Moreover, the “living” that is being treated is basically the living “of the mind,” the “life” of the intentional experiential stream and its contents. Yet it functions thus even while having intimately contributing to it bodily agencies whose “goings-on” provide elaborate, sense-complex experiential dimensions—for example, again, the “*Leib*”-body as “center of orientation” or as possessing visual and tactual capabilities or as the “organ of the will and the seat of free movement.”¹⁸ Just *how* the biological

¹⁸ Titles, and subject matters, for §§36, 37, 38, and 41 a).

here gets recognized and taken up into phenomenology remains a bit unclear. Later Husserl does offer some points on this and I shall mention that shortly. Right here in *Ideas II*, however, the only allowable structural relation is that of providing a “foundation” for the “higher-stratum” of living *consciousness*, and therein belonging to the general order asserted for all “lower levels” of phenomena in the almost “layer-cake” structure of human being.

Restricting myself only to these considerations from *Ideas II*, let me now move to the way Husserl takes up the question of “nature and spirit” in his courses of lectures under that title, “Natur und Geist,” to end up making a few additional comments on his “Crisis”-writings.

The first thing to say in general about Husserl’s raising the question of nature and spirit is that he is consistent in the way he approaches it: it is a matter of inquiring into the *kinds of investigation*, in systematic methodicalness, that are appropriate to each of the regions, nature and spirit. In other words, the Diltheyan approach that faces the existing difference between and contrasts *Naturwissenschaft* and *Geisteswissenschaft* in their respective basic aims and methodologies is the approach that frames Husserl’s own effort to make clear how the two differ as rational enterprises, even if he moves to a very different source for it in his analysis of the one experiential world as the horizon for all experiential and cognitive determinations. Thus Husserl proposes to find it necessary, within the already given two-domain framework, to “push through to the philosophical-phenomenological problems, to a universal philosophy as *Geisteswissenschaft* in a universal and transcendental sense.”¹⁹ This “universal [or: all-comprehensive] science [*Universalwissenschaft*]” will not be one that stands alongside other sciences, but rather one that “stretches over all sciences, reaches through all of them, and cannot be separated from any of them, nor any from it.”²⁰ This means recognizing two points. On the one hand, all sciences, of physical phenomena as well as of human phenomena (a rough but not exact equivalent to saying they are about *Natur* or about *Geist*), have an intrinsic setting in and adherence to the *one horizon of horizons*, the *world* of actual experience. There is one “universe of being [*Seinsuniversum*],” he writes, the one universe “pregiven” to us in “the universal [or: all-encompassing–*universal*] experience that runs all through all life.”²¹ Because of that, both nature [*Natur*] and spirit [*Geist*], despite the world-embracing character of each concept, only make sense as non-independent in a binding relation

¹⁹ From Husserl’s letter to Heidegger, May 8, 1927 (Husserliana Dokumente IV, *Briefwechsel*, IV, p. 141), and quoted by Weiler in his “Einleitung” to HuaXXXII, the *Natur und Geist* volume, p. XXXV.

²⁰ Again, from Husserl’s “Einleitung,” Hua XXXII, p. 6.

²¹ Op. cit., p. 14.

with each another: “nature is not conceivable without spirit, spirit not conceivable without nature. . . . Nature has also spirit-determinations, spirit has also nature-determinations. This means that any scientifically closed off conceptuality is an abstraction [*abstraktiv*].”²² Since, then, these two supreme conceptual science regions “link together essentially in the *all-encompassing concept of the world*,” Husserl will ultimate and radically clarify the sense of each by relating each back to the “all-encompassing concept of the world” in a “description of the world purely as the world of experience [*Erfahrung*].” This is what shall make transcendental phenomenological philosophy the one, all-embracing philosophical science [*Wissenschaft*].²³

Husserl, however, doesn’t actually get all this done in his lectures. He achieves only the first stage, namely, examining the respective methodologies of the *Naturwissenschaften* and the *Geisteswissenschaften* for the way they might make any move toward this “all-encompassing” inquiry focused on the world of experience, and then pointing out how that step is really not begun in either set of enterprises. It is phenomenology that, going beyond each, will actually and fully carry it out—but there the semester ends. The program is in place in its principles, but its achievement is left waiting; an elaboration of that achievement is in the end what the “Crisis”-writings finally offer, even if still introductory in several respects.

However, let us not yet leave the *Natur und Geist* lectures, because there are points of considerable interest that were in some way conveyed in the lectures, despite the limited treatment in the actual text for them. This is what we see in the two sets of notes on the lectures by students who attended them, parts of which are given in *Husserliana* XXXII. One such set is by Eugen Fink, the other by Johannes Pfeiffer, and a selection is taken from each to represent how Husserl may have ended his course of lectures, given the abrupt ending of the prepared text. What is interesting, then, about these two summaries is that they record something of what Husserl actually said when, as he himself noted,²⁴ he spoke beyond the written text of the lectures, that is, beyond the text material of the *Husserliana* volume. What I wish to do, then, is to draw out from them several points of critical interest to our comprehen-

²² Op. cit., p. 16.

²³ Op. cit., p. 16-17

²⁴ See footnote 1 to Weiler’s “Einleitung,” *Hua* XXXII, p. XI, and the actual note of Husserl’s on his giving his lecture partly in departure from the text (p. 288), written on one of the internal manuscript covers: “zum Teil frei, ohne Manuskript gesprochen.”

sive understanding of Husserl’s program which the text itself stops short of providing, but which was taken up by his listeners.

Let me begin the notes Fink made from the very beginning of Husserl’s 1927 *Natur und Geist* lectures (and not included in Hua XXXII.) What is striking about the summation Fink makes here is the trenchancy with which he puts the considerations that I represented earlier from Husserl’s actual prepared text. Here is how Fink summarizes the lectures’ opening:

Taking up the issue of the modern conflict over the question of principles and the final determination of the sense of natural science and human science [*Naturwissenschaft und Geisteswissenschaft*] we ask: Is the division of the world into these two scientific regions a pure (ontological) division, are we supposed to show nature, and spirit [*Geist*] as well, in every instance as a closed thematic region that can be investigated in a corresponding attitude of abstractness? It is clear from the start that there is a final unity of both great scientific thematics, a unity whereby the two belong to one concrete world as abstract layers; what needs to be asked is only whether an attitude directed to one abstract layer can be carried through *purely* without in every case transcending itself [*transcendieren*]. Are nature and spirit two fundamental structures of the concrete world?²⁵

When, now, we get to the end of this set of summary notes, after the more pronounced anticipation with which it opens of a kind of understanding that is would accept neither “nature” nor “spirit” as ultimate, but that the ultimate would be something that would embrace, and presumably *integrate* both, do we in fact find more said about any such final understanding? Do we find an understanding of the two kinds of science that goes beyond their dichotomy, that is, without adhering one-sidedly to one of them because both belong to something greater that presumably *neither* adequately deals with?

Here is where Michael Weiler helps with his editorial remarks on the two summaries by indicating the way each summary emphasizes the theme of *life* as pivotal for integrative conclusion. True, Husserl has from the beginning of phenomenology, as we have seen, emphasized the dynamic process of the intentional bond of openness to the world as defining of the life of human conscious experience, but the two summaries, picking up on Husserl’s mention of “life’s self-interpretation,”²⁶ indicate some bringing of *the biological* into coincidence with intentional experience in phenomenological analysis. While any number of complex issues are given, both in Pfeiffer’s summary and Fink’s more compact re-

²⁵ “E. Husserl: *Natur und Geist*. (Kolleg des SS 1927, Nachschrift:E. Fink),“ typescript in the Eugen-Fink-Archive, Archiv der Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg, p. 1.

²⁶ Hua XXXII, p. 147.

ording, the provocative point is this: An overcoming of the nature-spirit division by a rethinking life has to be centered before all else on *human* being, on *human* life; for that is where the unification of nature and spirit is actually and concretely achieved. The *way* the unification in that approach, then, would be found is in conducting one's descriptive interpretation of human being specifically *in terms of* phenomenological intentional process, in terms of the same dynamic constitutive structure of temporally intentional engagement with the world. Here, now, a statement is made of how biological life fits in with this temporal-intentional life, in Fink's summary:

“Organic being [*Wesen*]” is a unique type of natural objects that deviates from the type physical thing. It has another genuine kind of identity (identity in becoming), just as it presents of itself a quasi-teleology. “Biological being” <is> again a new type that, founded in nature [*natural fundiert*], is primarily of spirit [*geistig*]. Meaningful things, cultural products (“tools,” purposeful structures, “objective spirit”) = interpretive approachability [*Zugänglichkeit*].” Animalia, “enworlded” subjectivity is experienced originarily in empathy [*Einfühlung*].²⁷

In the end, however, the unification comes in a transcendental phenomenology that has to be distinguished from the kinds of living being just delineated because it would go beyond any in-the-world condition, whether for nature or for spirit:

A mundanely oriented ontology such as that within the epoché [i.e., as in the text just quoted] only gives the transcendental clue to the genuine constitutive problematic. Only phenomenological reflection, that is, the understanding-guided thematization [*verstehend Thematisierung*] of the otherwise anonymous performing life, that reflection that can be “spirit” in a much more original sense than any “enworlded” spirit discovered in intentionally performing subjectivity, only this kind of reflection is capable of delivering a radical understanding of all ontic objectivity and thereby also the grounding all sciences that relate to the world.²⁸

²⁷ Hua XXXII, p. 266. I am leaving the term ‘*Einfühlung*’ uncommented on here, because there is a complicated issue that its use introduces. On the one hand it primarily means the “empathy” in terms of which persons are in felt accord, an effect prominent as the way one is aware of one's fellow human *as* human in *Ideas II*, Section Two, Chapter 4 (in no small part showing extensive formulation by Edit Stein). On the other hand, there is the felt movement of one's own life in terms of which one is aware of oneself, prior to explicit self-identification as *I myself* (see *Ideas II*, Section Three, §58, and Supplement XII). This is something I shall return to at the very end, in Section 3, B. The materiality of nature.

²⁸ Hua XXXII, p. 266-267

Pfeiffer is a little more specific:

Thus what shows here is “*biological*” method as the theoretical correlate of an abstract layer in the world, “*organic nature*,” the material [*sachlich*; or, perhaps here: fact-based] structure which marks out other ways of methodical inquiry than those adequate for “material [*materielle*] nature”. – Thus the theoretical knowledge of the “*world of spirit [der geistigen Welt]*” demands a radical change of attitude, the shift out of the “*naturalistic*” and the “*biologistic*” attitude into the “*personalistic*,” in which for the first time “*spirit*” as “personal subjectivity” and also as “objective spirit,” the sphere of “ideal” cultural objects, becomes something-one-has-entry to [*zugänglich*].²⁹

Finally, the last lines of Pfeiffer’s summary (which in fact follow directly after the text just quoted) rephrase another important point that we already saw in the final lines of Fink’s summary (viz., the comment on “that reflection that can be “spirit” in a much more original sense than any “enworlded” spirit”):

However, the core philosophical problem is the “*ambiguous meaning of spirit*”: namely, that on the one hand spirit is “realized in-the-world [*weltlich realisierter*],” spirit (as “human”), spirit as object of a science in-the-world [*Weltwissenschaft*] (science of the spirit—*Geisteswissenschaft*), whereas on the other hand as transcendental, as “absolute subjectivity,” the sphere of origination found in reflecting on oneself in philosophical thinking [*philosophischen Besinnung*], spirit is for the constitution of the sense of being [*Seinssinn*] as such.³⁰

Here, then, is the problem of problems that I have to argue lies right within the whole issue of nature and spirit in phenomenology.

First of all, the principle of unification in *Ideas II* that is meant to show how material nature and the animal body integrate with the soul and the spirit/person in a step-like composition, is that of the relation of foundedness with respect to that on which it is founded. Being founded means forming a whole with the foundation, such that if the founded constituent is dealt with as in itself, that is, if it is no longer considered in terms of its strict non-independence as a constituent in the whole, its proper concretum, it becomes an abstractum;³¹ This basic conception of “foundedness” Husserl laid out in his

²⁹ Hua XXXII, p. 279—italics (actually, *Sperrung*) in Pfeiffer’s text.

³⁰ Ibid., italics (again *Sperrung* in Pfeiffer’s text).

³¹ This is the gist of Husserl’s opening points in his “Third Logical Investigation,” his “Theory of Wholes and Parts.

“Third Logical Investigation” and applied throughout *Ideas II*. It seems clear that it is the conception still applying here in *Natur und Geist*.

Secondly, however, it is clear that there is a momentous transition that takes place at some point in this sequence of “foundings” that links a) natural body to animal body, b) the resultant unit in turn to soul, and c) this unit to personal spirit; and the pivotal; and problematic place of the linkage is there between “animal body” and “soul.” For it is there that operations going on begin to leave behind the sheer material physicality of causal natural events to take on the dynamic of *non-physical sense-coherence* and *continuous development* that is at the heart of the life of consciousness—so much so that, as we saw in the first text quoted from Fink’s summary, “biological being” is “of a new type,” namely, although “founded in nature [*natural fundiert*], [it] is primarily *of spirit* [*geistig*].”³² What *Ideas II* focuses on is precisely the “*spirit*”-factor that emerges in “biological being” (not named in that work), the dimension wherein what is in play is *intentional sense* and the *meaning-motivational* impulse it has—differing completely in kind from any physical force—effecting the connections that make for coherence and continuity in the on-going of conscious life. This is the transition by virtue of which phenomenology in the “epoché” can be characterized, as it is in the “Crisis”-writings, as focused *exclusively* on “the universal horizon of the ‘pure internal life’ [*des reinen ‘Innenlebens’*], of intentional life as accomplishing sense and validity,” where one has hold of “the actual, genuine—I emphasize once more again—absolutely self-enclosed problematic of intentionality, that of the pure psychology that belongs, then, to all the sciences (the psychophysical, the biological) that deal with the psychic [*mit Psychischem*].”³³

Is this an “abstraction” that takes “spirit” *away from* the foundational ground of physical “materiality” necessary to its functioning at all, or is this a penetration into the heart of the “natural” in that *living* moment of natural materiality whereby it reaches to the level of “interpreting itself”—i.e., coming to *reflect* upon itself—as the final portion of Husserl’s *Natur und Geist* lectures seems to indicate, and as the “Crisis”-writings emphasize in the concept of transcendental subject’s self-knowing of its own constituting effectuations? Is this a fulfillment of nature’s potential, or a leaving of it far behind? Is the natural factor of the biological *transcended* in the subjectivity of intentional life as that “higher” level in which alone meaning and meaningfulness can be in play, or is the play of meaning and meaningful-

³² Hua XXXII, p. 266, my italics and bold typeface of the final expression..

³³ Hua VI, p. 246 (in David Carr’s translation, here slightly modified, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 242.

ness already within the capacity of the natural *precisely as* subjective life? Does the developmental dynamic of the intentional “take” of something in terms of *sense*—which is the comprehensive genus of conscious life as such and correlates intimately with the way something can *appear*—not remain material in some sense that respects the two senses of “material” that are expressed separately in the German terms *sachlich* and *materiell*? Does the way in which the organic, bodily materiality of the senses, in their functioning in the sense-ful appearing of objects, has the sole role of being substrate for the foundedness of the properly “*geistig*” dimension, do *justice* to that biological materiality *on the transcendental level*? Or, to put it another way, does materiality have a non-naturalistic and yet not strictly *geistig* significance within transcendental subjectivity that is yet to be elicited?

In the *Natur und Geist* lectures Husserl shows he is not oblivious to the way biology departs from standard physical and chemical kinds of analyses. Still, for all his recognition of these differences, it is clear Husserl takes his lead for the performances specific to “transcendental subjectivity” from what he sees of possibilities within the straightforward *Geisteswissenschaften*, and not in such an ambiguously proceeding *Naturwissenschaft* as biology.³⁴ And this is the approach he continues in the “Crisis”-texts.

Fink and Pfeiffer seem to represent the solution Husserl envisages as offering a conception of the “transcendental” that doesn’t remain exclusively *within* the sphere of *either* of the two factors in conflict, nature and spirit, in asserting the move beyond a physicalistic, objectivistic notion of nature on the one hand, and a radicalization of the notion of spirit, on the other. Modeled after the course’s note-takers put it, we may assert a) in Fink’s phrasing (above p. 18), “‘spirit’ [is to be taken] in a much more original sense than any ‘enworlded’ spirit, discovered in intentionally performing subjectivity,” will be; and b), in Pfeiffer’s summary, spirit is “ambiguous” (above, p. 19), even presumably in its “personalistic” heights, such that in principle one cannot say simply that the “absolute subjectivity” to be reached is *just like me*. It turns out that Husserl in the *Crisis* says as much,³⁵ without specifying exactly how this “absolute subjectivity” is *not* “just like me.” Yet there is one pronounced feature in this whole setting that one must not overlook here—and this is a huge difference!—namely, that absolute subjectivity

³⁴ See Husserl’s own “Einleitung” to his 1927 course of lectures in “Nature and Spirit,” Hua XXXII, p. 11, for an overview of biological interests that depart from straightforward physical interests, and the question he raises about its validity as a science, namely, that its conceptions are all confused.. Husserl believes he clears up the confusions by reading the non-physical elements as *geistig*, that is, as *psychisch* in sense this takes on in phenomenological analysis. See Hua §70, p. 246.

³⁵ In particular the closing sections of parts III A and B, respectively (§§53-55 and §72.

constitutes the world. It is hard to see how any human individual could in principle claim that heroic operation.

This is the kind of implied caution Pfeiffer ends with, except that he phrases that he heard have Husserl speaking in terms of attributing to “transcendental subjectivity” the constitutive origination “of *the sense of being* [*Seinssinn*]” (see above, p. 15; here my bold italics). We have obviously reached the moment for a segue to Heidegger.

3. Heidegger

It is well known—perhaps one should say it is a piece of received “wisdom”—that Heidegger is quite on target when he argues Husserl simply doesn’t recognize the question of the meaning of being. Going along with this is the other well-known—or widely accepted—idea that Heidegger’s early writings all make sense as a faithfully focused march of working towards raising the question of the meaning of being, and then attempting to clarify that meaning, that finally bursts into full manifestation in *Being and Time*.³⁶ The trouble with this story, however, is that it isn’t entirely consistent with a careful reading of Heidegger’s lectures from 1919 to 1923, unless one is already committed to the idea that this track of work *must be* all aimed at the question of the meaning of being. Let me mention one fine, compact account account, for example, “Phänomenologie – Heidegger und Husserl,” by Christoph Jamme in the excellent collection *Heidegger Handbuch*,³⁷ that, even if its author is not pushing the point as far as I think it can be (or ought to be), nonetheless allows one to recognize a powerful earlier orientation on Heidegger’s part inflecting the question of the meaning of being in a pronounced way. It should be no surprise that this earlier focus is aimed at the elucidation of human *life* precisely *as* intrinsic to what he struggles to make clear as the primary philosophical enterprise.

³⁶ I have given here the usual phrasing for the expressions *der Sinn von Sein* or *Seinssinn*, namely, as “the *meaning* of being.” However, I would argue that it makes better sense to say “the *sense* of being,” but I shall not attempt to argue that here directly.

³⁷ “1.7 Stichwort: Phänomenologie – Heidegger und Husserl,” in *Heidegger Handbuch, Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, ed. by Dieter Thomä (Stuttgart, Weimar: Verlag J.B. Metzler, 2003), pp. 37-47. That Heidegger began, thus, with an existential focus on life is what Gilbert Lepadatu—and he bears the credit for it—first brought to my attention as he began investigating this very point for a dissertation at the University of Kentucky, which in fact is what he is currently working on.

It is quite noticeable that the manner in which Heidegger thus before *Being and Time* frames the concern for human existence is not by way of the question of *der Seinssinn* (or *der Sinn von Sein*), but rather by way of the pressing issue of the kind of *life* human life is and how it should be inquired into, and for that purpose how it should be indicated. Heidegger's efforts at this stage embrace two questions: a) *how* human life is experienced and b) how one is *aware of* and *thinks* about it *within* one's actually experiencing it and in a way *true to* its very coursing. In a parallel, *mutatis mutandis*, to the case of Husserl's coming to his phenomenology as working out investigations faithful to "die Sachen selbst" in a conjunction of influences from others, Heidegger's working toward the way best to reach an original and radical philosophic understanding of human living was equally an effort undertaken in a confluence of insights drawn from many predecessors. Let me give you a summary overview of how he was working in the period 1919-1923, even though I shall give special attention to but one name in particular, that of a thinker whose writings clearly struck Heidegger's forcefully for his own thinking—Wilhelm Dilthey.

If we look at Heidegger's lecturing from this time, 1919 to 1923, two features show as consummately important in his effort to define his own philosophic program. The first it is his insistence that the way philosophy must turn to human life to take it *in its actual going-on*, precisely *as a concrete realization* and not in the abstract as a concept or as some kind of static state. Life exists *as a living*, as the "doing" or "performing" of life, not as a *thinking* about it. We see this point expressed, for example, in the review he wrote of Karl Jaspers' book, *Psychologie der Welanschauungen*,³⁸ completed in June of 1921 when he sent it to Jaspers, but apparently worked on, off and on, for at least a year or two. Here he explains that far from taking "existence" as a mere "regional determination," which would be a failure to understand just what goes on to allow one to say "I am." Existence is the "way of being" for the 'I' [*Seinsweise des Seins des 'ich'*], is "the performing (or: enacting) of 'am' [*Vollzug des 'bin'*]," not a thinking of it. "Decisive here," he continues, "is that I *have myself*, the fundamental experience

³⁸ Berlin: Springer, 1919. Now the opening essay in GA 9, *Wegmarken*, Heidegger's review was not published until 1973. Jamme points out in his treatment that the point Heidegger is making is not unique; Husserl's makes the same case against Descartes' idea of strictly *reflective* knowing of his own existence (*Heidegger Handbuch*, p. 40, column 2, and we actually saw something like that earlier, on p. 6). Here, however, one should notice that the "reflective knowing" that Descartes is said to argue for is that found in the first half of his *Meditations*. In contrast, his "Sixth Meditation" seems to suggest something rather different, namely, an awareness that is itself *lived* before being thought about, such as that of feeling pain or other kinds of pronounced sensation.

[*Grunderfahrung*] in which I meet myself as Self so that, living in this experience and fitting *its* sense, I can ask about the meaning of my ‘I am’.” Everything depends upon this “performing [or, as the current translations put it, enacting] of experience [*Erfahrungsvollzug*]”; and the sense of the being that I “have” in thus recognizing my own being is what can be called “existence.”³⁹

Interestingly enough, this is an elaboration decidedly influenced by Dilthey’s making a similar point in his 1910 book, *The Formation of the Historical world in the Human Sciences*,⁴⁰ but with a significant difference. Heidegger focuses on finding the “performing of experience” to give the proper “going-on” for giving the sense to “existence.” However, while this may seem, and rightly so, to be an anticipation of Heidegger’s eventual focus on “the sense of being,” what is important here is to see how this sense of being *is gained*, namely, precisely in the *living* of one’s being; and living one’s being means experientially “performing” or “enacting” it (or simply “*doing*”) it. One has to note carefully that this “doing [*Vollzug*],” is not some kind of deliberate action, but simply the “carrying on” or “on-going” of my life, as it were *by its own power*, or, as we also might put it, *by its intrinsic dynamic*. Now Heidegger doesn’t put things this way, and we know that eventually temporalization [*Zeitigung*] as such will be the “motor,” the “*dynamis*,” of existence. Right at present, however, it is not that motor. That is indicated by his writing the following formulation, again in his review:

The factic, historically done [*vollzugsgeschichtliche*] life carried on in the “how” of the problematic of how the self in its concern has itself properly [*im faktischen Wie der Problematic des Wie der bekümmerten Seltstaenigung des Selbst*] belongs originally to the sense of the factic “I am.”⁴¹

³⁹ *Wegmarken*, in GA 9 (but not in the earlier, pre-GA edition of the book), p. 29. Heidegger actually adds that what I understand in thus saying “I am” on the basis of *being* myself in a living, experiential way “formally indicates” “existence.” However, I am leaving aside here the whole issue of “formal existence”. The English here is largely my own translation, although there is a published translation from which I adapted some expressions: Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, edited by William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 25.

⁴⁰ See Second Study, 1.2. The Relation between Lived Experience [*Erlebnis*] and Psychic Object, in *Selected Works*, Vol. III, ed. by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 46-54, and especially pp. 48-49. This, of course, is the English translation of *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*, first published in 1910 and now in Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* Vol. VII. The relative passage in this GS edition is on p.27.

⁴¹ GA 9, p. 34 (my translation, which one can compare to the rendering in *Pathmarks*, p. 30-31).

Just what this means, however, we can better grasp by studying the courses of lectures Heidegger was giving that surround this review in the period 1919-1923. In these lectures we see in no small detail, in a continuum of effort, how he critically situates his program in distinction from Rickert's, Natorp's, and indeed Dilthey's. For example, in his 1921 review of Jasper's book Heidegger does not use Dilthey's—and Husserl's—term for the “going-on” that is at the heart of human experiential/existential life. Instead of *Erlebnis* he writes “*Erfahrung*, as in an expression such as “die faktische Lebenserfahrung selbst.”⁴² This is in contrast to some of writings both before and after, for example his lectures in his “War Emergency” course in the first half of 1919, where he quite consciously uses the term ‘*Erlebnis*’,” doing so quite consistently.⁴³ The shift in usage is no accident. The reason seems to be that from early 1919 to early 1920 he had worked out a detailed critique of the treatment of *Erlebnis* by Paul Natorp on hand, and on the other that by Dilthey.

What is at issue in this development on Heidegger's part is the second feature that I suggested earlier characterizes Heidegger's work in this period, namely, that the attempt to delineate this “performance/enactment” that is life has to *fit the character* of that performance/enactment. Crucial here is the realization that this going-on of life is done as a dynamic of *significance* wherein that life consists in the *coherence and cohesion as meaningfulness* of what it has become and goes on to become cumulatively. In a word, the going-on is an unceasing *historical achievement*, again very much in accord with Dilthey's sense.⁴⁴ In the winter semester of 1919-1920⁴⁵ Heidegger was very much focused on the problem of exactly how one can follow the on-going enactment/performance of life in such a way as to “get” it or recognize it precisely as that. Although lessons for determining “how” to do this can be found in many places, Heidegger here acknowledges one locus that certainly bespeaks an abiding of his at that time. He writes: “The deepest historical paradigm for the notable problem of shifting the center of gravity of factic life and the lifeworld to the self-world and the world of inner experiences is given in

⁴² GA 9, p. 34 (*Pathways*, p. 29).

⁴³ GA 56/57. A striking example of Heidegger's choice of *Erlebnis*—and an unusual seeming foreshadowing of GA 65, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*—is GA 56/57 §15, where the same point just discussed is elaborated in terms of the “er-” of both *Erlebnis* and *Ereignis*.

⁴⁴ See e.g., Part II, Drafts for a Critique of Historical Reason, III. The Categories of Life, “Meaning,” and “Meaning and Structure,” in *Selected Works*, Vol. III, pp. 252-260.

⁴⁵ GA 58, “Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie.”

the arising of Christianity.”⁴⁶ This, of course, sets the perspective for his lectures in the winter semester of 1920-1921, on “The Phenomenology of Religious Life,” but we shall get to that in a moment. In 1920-21 Heidegger’s concern is *how* exactly to reach to the experiential ground from factic life as the starting point; how examining factic life *enables* one to reach its ground of originary experience. In a word the question is how does the ground—the on-going of experience—for the grounded—factic life—*become accessible*?⁴⁷ It is not a matter of just being in some vague way aware of the going-on as always in play, but of *gaining* it [*Gewinnung*] experientially in its “standing out” as grounding. What is “*the manner of experiencing the selfworld [die Weise des Erfahrens der Selbstwelt]*”⁴⁸?

This is where a pivotal finding is made—and again a point central to Dilthey’s work, even if transformed in characterization here in unequivocally Heideggerian fashion. As in every respect that is to be found here, Heidegger insists, “In the coherencies of meaningfulness [*Bedeutsamkeitszusammenhängen*] I experience the world in a living way. The world announces itself as actual in those coherencies.”⁴⁹ Remarkable here is the fact that this, in Heidegger’s reformulation, is consistent with Dilthey and with Husserl, even if all three have significant elements that are mutually divergent; and one such main divergence is Husserl’s *epoché*. Dilthey is pre-*epoché* in his work, Heidegger works in rejection of *epoché* in Husserl’s sense; and yet Heidegger refashions it in a way all his own, namely, in finding “existence” as a distinctive, irreducibly unique “way of being” for human living being that can only be reached by a way applicable to “existence” alone—which is precisely what he is trying to work out.

Now, sadly, in this same course of lectures, Heidegger’s text gives out before the end, so that what he proposed is represented in a assemblage of Heidegger’s own notes and by a relatively coherent summary by an attending student, the redoubtable Oskar Becker. It is this *Nachschrift* that I wish to cite in order to demonstrate a point. Almost at the very end Becker notes Heidegger as explaining, in most felicitous phrasing, that one ought not be disappointed if one finds “no ‘I’ in the bright light of consciousness, but only the rhythm of experiencing itself.” Becker’s text continues, for Heidegger: “I am concrete to myself in a specific experience of life [*Lebenserfahrung*], I am in a *situation*.”⁵⁰ This, then,

⁴⁶ GA 58, p. 61.

⁴⁷ “Problem ist: Zugänglichkeit des Ursprungsgebietes vom faktischen Leben aus.” GA 58, p. 82.

⁴⁸ GA 58, p. 101; and notice: *Erfahrung*, not *Erlebnis*; italics all Heidegger’s..

⁴⁹ “In Bedeutsamkeitszusammenhängen lebend erfahre ich die Welt. Sie bekundet sich als wirkliche in jenen.” GA 58, p. 107.

⁵⁰ GA58, p. 258.

leads to the question of how a situation can be determined as *one* situation, as *a particular* situation with a *concretely particular* character, in terms of which I can find myself as concretely *myself*; for that will be “the Urstruktur of the situation.”⁵¹

Against any objectification, now—so Heidegger still—one has to realize that what I experience and live through [*erfahren und erleben*], that is, the “*content*” of a situation, is something quite special and yet always in play: Heidegger is represented as saying “the form of any content [of an experienced situation] gets its ultimate sense in the experience of life itself.” In particular, as a prime example of what “the form of any content” must be, “space and time, in their original form in the sphere of life”—that is, before they get an objective cosmic meaning (and Heidegger credits Bergson’s *Essais sur les données immédiates de la conscience* [Paris, 1889] for this insight)—are in fact, as is everything in our experience as coherent, “*meanings* [or: *meaningfulness*, but pluralized: *Bedeutsamkeiten*]” which, as such, “have their function in the situation.”⁵² This in turn leads to Heidegger’s delineating the “sense of drawn-to [*Bezugssinn*]” in play in experienced life, that is, the way motivating meaningfulness is drawn on or toward by a felt tendency. “The sense of drawn-to is not a relationship between two objects, but is simply the sense of one’s own going-on as taken up in a situation”—if I may thus somewhat freely render the Heideggerian way of putting things here: “*Der Bezugssinn ist keine Beziehung zwischen zwei Objekten, sondern ist selbst schon Sinn eines Vollzugs, eines Dabeiseins des Selbst.*”⁵³

This allows a formulation, then, that defines the concrete life-situation of myself as such: the “*Urstruktur*” of the situation is the integratedness of the way the sense of drawn-to in motivation [*Bezugssinn*], the sense of performance/enactment in one’s living through a concrete experiential situation [*Bezugssinn*], and the character of the experiential as sense [*Gehaltsins*] all come together *as meaningful* in the spontaneity of its occurrence concretely in the situation. And the heightening reached in this living spontaneity is what makes for “life in-and-for-itself”—and this is what it means to be *existent*.⁵⁴ From this, now, Heidegger’s lectures allow finally saying just how one indeed *reaches* this all-encompassing original happening in one’s experientially enhanced, and apparently quite definitely focused, effort: “Phenomenological understanding [*Verstehen*] is nothing else than an intuitional going-

⁵¹ GA 58, p. 259.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ GA 58, p. 260.

⁵⁴ GA 260-261. The final point is expressed thus: “*Der Vollzugssinn entspringt aus der Spontaneität des Selbst. Sofern er so gesteigert lebendig ist, ist ursprüngliches Leben existent.*”

along-with or running-along-in the sense [*ein anschauliches Mitgehen, Hinlaufen an dem Sinn entlang*].”⁵⁵

What does this give us in the end? In an almost Aristotelian usage of ordinary nouns, adverbs, and verbs—and recall how studiously Heidegger is about to dedicate himself to reading Aristotle—that in no way are technical theoretical terms, but simple wordings of something also simple, yet so very elusive, Heidegger wants us to think as a carefully aimed and yet non-abstractive and non-theoretical following of *the going-on of my very self* in my living experience.⁵⁶ Although Heidegger doesn’t say here, or anywhere, so far as I know, this is Descartes’ “I think,” not as thinking *about* existing, but *as itself existing*; it is the “I think” of awareness *in and as* my very existing—the self-aware *Vollzug* of my existing. For remember, Descartes actually puts the “I am” in “Meditation Two” *without a “therefore”* linking it with the “I am.” It is not an inference, it is, as I would put it—Heidegger doesn’t—in a manner perhaps closer to Dilthey, the sense of the concrete, self-aware *Erleben* of one’s being, a *Vollzugssinn*. To put it this way, however, introduces the whole issue of Heidegger’s reservations about the term ‘*Erlebnis*,’ which are given in his treatment of the issue in his lectures of the very next semester, in the summer of 1920, under the title “Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks” (GA 59).

In this course of these lectures, now, what is really at issue is not an analysis of either intuition or expression, but rather determining the core of the philosophical enterprise from within, and in part against, the dominant centering of philosophy, in the then contemporary setting, “on life as the *Urphe-nomenon*.”⁵⁷ And the two philosophic figures whose work is to be examined in this undertaking are Paul Natorp and Wilhelm Dilthey. One may well ask why these two? The answer is fairly straightforward: both are dominant figures in philosophy at the time (but where is Husserl?) and the combination

⁵⁵ GA 58, p. 262.

⁵⁶ Analogous to the way Aristotle, rather than a concept-word such as “relation” or “relationship,” uses *προς τι*, to(ward) something—a standard Greek usage of preposition+pronoun (or noun)—Heidegger uses verbs and adverbial particles, *Hin-laufen an dem Sinn entlang*, to express the “getting it” here in play. Similarly, *Be-zug*, rather than a simple abstract noun—“relation,” its usual rendering—is taken in a dynamically concrete sense as the “draw to/on towards” something, which, like *προς τι*, is embedded in what it means. Instead of being the *name* for a something, such expressions, like *προς τι*, are a *vector* of sense or meaning. Something of this characteristic, I would suggest, is what functions in Heidegger’s burgeoning idea of “formal indication.”

⁵⁷ GA 59, p. 15.

offers Heidegger the opportunity to give a positive delineation to the approach he is working out in its overcoming the primary limitations to philosophic work those two thinkers incarnate.

On the one hand, when measured by “the standard” of “concrete being of one’s own world,”⁵⁸ Natorp exemplifies the limitations of “transcendental philosophy” (and perhaps he functions as the stand-in for Husserl), whereas Dilthey, positively contrasting with the “empty formality” of transcendental philosophy exemplifies “life-philosophy” which for Heidegger is “a necessary station on the way to [genuine] philosophy.”⁵⁹ As a result Heidegger gives a highly positive evaluation of Dilthey (see the whole of Section II of GA 60), in order in the end to show how he, Heidegger, goes beyond Dilthey’s limitations to the true concrete root of human life and being. Here is where one begins to see why it is that Heidegger avoids using *Erlebnis* in favor of *Erfahrung*: the first is too fraught with unwanted connotations in its dominant life-philosophy usage, leaving the second more suitable to Heidegger’s purposes.

Unfortunately once again, a sizeable portion of Heidegger’s actual lecture text is not extant. The whole section on Dilthey is represented in the Gesamtausgabe edition by the most complete version of several *Nachschriften*, namely, the one made once again by Oskar Becker. It is there that Heidegger’s critique of Dilthey is represented and there where we find more of the reasons for Heidegger’s preferring *Erfahrung* in place of Dilthey’s *Erlebnis*. Heidegger’s critique is both positive in applauding directions Dilthey took, and negative, identifying the limitations there. For example, fundamental for Dilthey is that “the whole of lived experience [*das Ganze des Erlebens*] is a nexus of effectuation [*Wirkungszusammenhang*]. Lived experience has the basic character of an actuality [*Wirklichkeit*].” But Dilthey, allowing a certain transcendental bent to creep in, does not see this life-nexus of effectuation as itself originally a true kind of “understanding [*Verstehen*]”; the particular structures of this “life-nexus of effectuation” may indeed form a unity, but it is still only the “*condition for the possibility* of the understanding of life’s unity.”⁶⁰ Human life in on its origin-level and in its basic core is a bundling of “feeling and drives; volition, need, and satisfaction are the elementary powers of the soul.” This as the heart of *Erleben* in its unitary character is a kind of “pre-figuration [*Vorform*] of understanding [*Verstehen*],” and therefore the “sciences of spirit” can develop as the carrying out of this prefiguration [*eine Ausformung der faktischen Lebenserfahrung*]; but the actual exercise of understanding is not

⁵⁸ GA 59, p. 146.

⁵⁹ GA 59, p. 154.

⁶⁰ GA 59, p. 165, my emphasis.

original.⁶¹ Original to the soul is the system of “driving powers [*Triebkräfte*]” as “impetus [*Antrieb*]” for development into further forms of the handling of meaning, most pronouncedly in forms of expression and understanding [*Ausdruck und Verstehen*].⁶²

What Heidegger sees missing in all this is that “the active draw of self to one’s world [*der aktuelle Selbstweltbezug*] plays no original role” in Dilthey’s position.⁶³ This means that “actual being does not become a possible problem,” and “the original motivation of philosophy is forgotten.” Heidegger’s primary insistence here is that philosophy has its proper work “before the conversion to a stance and before the configuration of experience according to the assignments of theoretical research”—both of which features characterize Dilthey’s work. In a word, “philosophy cannot be a science,”⁶⁴ as Dilthey in effect wishes to have it.

So what does Heidegger envision as the *Urstruktur* to be found in and as the experience of life? Here is his in this set of lectures as Becker records it: “The self in the actual performance of the experience of life [*im aktuellen Vollzug der Lebenserfahrung*], the self in the experience of itself, is the protoactuality [*Urwirklichkeit*].” Experience is not a simple “taking note of [*Kenntnisnehmen*],” but is instead “the living participation, being concerned [*das lebendige Beteiligtsein, das Bekümmertsein*], so that the self is continually codetermined by this exercise of concern [*Bekümmern*].” More than that: “All actuality receives its original sense by the concern exercised by the self [*durch die Bekümmern des Selbst*].”⁶⁵

It is Heidegger’s task, then, “to keep the facticity of life” and “to strengthen the facticity of being [*des Daseins*].” Grasping and disclosing the “sense of performance and draw-to [*den Sinn des Vollzugs und des Bezugs*]” intrinsic to philosophy in this task is something, Heidegger finds, no one has done

⁶¹ GA 59, p. 166.

⁶² GA 59, pp. 167 and 169. And here is where we see some reason for the title of the course of lectures.

⁶³ GA 59, p. 169.

⁶⁴ GA 59, p. 170.

⁶⁵ GA 59, p. 173. Lastly, too, on p. 171, Heidegger finally takes up the two terms of the course title to tie them to the actual aim of his study, and refashioning, of the life-element in the realm of the *Geisteswissenschaften*: “The questions about intuition and expression are thus to be understood this way: The question is raised about the how of philosophical experience and about the how in which philosophical this experience itself explicates itself, about the motive and the tendency of philosophical experience itself. From this stems the task of more surely setting the means and ways used by which we bring ourselves closer to the origin.”

with the exception of Karl Jaspers, despite the fact, he adds, that Jaspers did not actually see his way here—and he refers to the book by Jaspers, *Psychologie des Weltanschauungen*, of which he had written the review briefly considered earlier. As a final note: Heidegger remarks: achieving this “is only possible on the basis of Dilthey’s intuitions.”⁶⁶

From here the path Heidegger follows over the next three years ratifies, refines, clarifies, and extends what we have seen so far. In those years, too, we see many anticipations of the methodology, analyses, and findings such that we see in *Being and Time*, but, while that is a fascinating and important topic in itself, that is not my main point here.⁶⁷ Of course I do not intend to go through all those semesters, but simply to highlight a few examples of it in one or another of them. For example, in his “Phenomenology of religious life” (WS 1990-21), he reinforces the point that “all that is experienced in the factic experience of life bears the character of *meaningfulness*.”⁶⁸ Again, “the starting point and the aim of philosophy is the factic experience of life [*Lebenserfahrung*].”⁶⁹ Heidegger treats at some length what “formal indication” is methodologically, tying it directly to the role of performance (*Vollzug*) and the drawn-to (*Bezug*) factor: “Formal indication is a *defense*, a protective device that works out ahead of things so that the performance-character remains free.”⁷⁰ But then, circumstances turned him out, Heidegger immediately turns to have to treat religious experience as such, which he examines in such a way as to illustrate and confirm the insights we have seen him focus on in the preceding courses of lectures. In the semester following this (SS 1921, also in GA 60) he continues that line in a reading of St. Augustine; and only after that does he take up developing the whole undertaking further in his studies of Aristotle over the next two years.⁷¹ We have to pass over this, however, in order to

⁶⁶ GA 59, p. 174.

⁶⁷ It is, however, the main issue in Gilbert Lepadatu’s dissertation, namely, to show how Heidegger initially developed what became the essential methodology of *Being and Time* precisely for the purpose of explicating *factic life* as the concrete realization of human existence, and not for the sake of clarifying the meaning of being as such (or, as I think it should be put, the *sense* of being—a point I shall return to at the very end).

⁶⁸ GA 60, p. 13.

⁶⁹ GA 60, p. 15.

⁷⁰ GA 60, text from p. 64 within Chapter 4, §§11-13.

⁷¹ The three items of importance here are Heidegger’s WS 1920-22 course of lectures, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles; Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, GA 61; his SS 1922 course, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik*, GA

highlight the remarkable lectures entitled *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)*, GA 63. For here is virtually the peaking of the effort under way since 1919 in a brilliant, compactly expressed treatise on how to do what from the beginning he had been working toward: articulating the way of “getting to” one’s actual being that both *disclosed* it to oneself and *maintained* its dynamic coherency as the on-going concrete enterprise of engagement in the world that constitutes myself.

One notes virtually from the beginning that the text of this set of lectures approaches closely one of the major wordings in *Being and Time*: a) “Facticity is the designation of the being characteristic of ‘our’ ‘very own’ *being* [*Dasein*]”; and b) this means that each instance of the being thus characteristic of being is “there [*da*]”. At this point, however; there enters again the intrinsic element of the past three or four years of Heidegger’s thinking, namely, that in being characteristically *there*, *Dasein*/human being *is transitively*, that is, *Dasein*’s way of being is “factic life.”⁷² And “*Dasein* as such” remains “factic being” throughout the treatise, as the phrasing just given indicates from §17, where, it is worth adding, this is also immediately called “*being in a world*.”⁷³ The question, however, has to be asked, just what does Heidegger have in mind here *as “life”*? It is time to try to tease out some of the particulars about the regularly repeated word insofar as they supposedly add *something* to the “*Sein–Seiendes–Dasein*” wordings that figure so prominently in these lectures on “ontology” and the “hermeneutic of facticity”—even more so than in earlier lecture-course texts. This is the matter to be taken care of before we can finally bring Husserl’s work together with Heidegger’s on the question of life.

In the course on “ontology” there are a few places where Heidegger says something rather telling about life. In the “Introduction” to the course, in characterizing traditional “ontology,” Heidegger explains briefly how traditional theorizing, by taking any of its topics as a region “objects,” simply misses what “world” means. “World” is simply taken as a “region of objects” and not seen “in terms of *Dasein* and the possibilities intrinsic to *Dasein* [*aus Dasein und Daseinsmöglichkeiten*].” “Nature” thus has two senses, one “as a region of objects,” the other “as world” and this “on the basis of *Dasein* [*aus*

62; and his then unpublished early fall 1922 essay; “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotelis,” ed. by Hans Ulrich Lessing in *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften*, 6 (1989), pp. 235-274.

⁷² GA 63, p. 7, my rendering and paraphrasing.

⁷³ “*Dasein (faktisches Leben) ist Sein in einer Welt.*” Heidegger writes this sentence as a prime instance of “formal indication,” and he italicizes it. GA 63, p. 80. One sees the same designation, for example, on pp. 15, 18, 19, and 40 in.

Dasein].” “‘Nature’ is only formalized as world in terms of *Dasein*, historicity [*Geschichtlichkeit*], [thus, is] not the foundation of its [of nature as ‘world’] ‘temporality’; correspondingly living body [*Leib*].”⁷⁴

Now, this is some ambiguity the formulation here. If *Geschichtlichkeit* is taken to mean the “historicity” thematized in the historical human sciences—as the way I have rendered it here suggests—then what is spoken of here is derivative from the temporality that is of *Dasein*⁷⁵ as intrinsically engaging in the world and thereby the ground of what will later be called *Dasein*’s “historicity [*Geschichtlichkeit*].” “Formalize” here would thus mean to construe something, in this case “nature,” in terms of the way that the world comes about precisely in the sense of the concrete surroundings of *Dasein*’s engagements; “nature” thus becomes an element in *Dasein*’s “world” rather than being taken it in the prevailing sense of the “in-itself” objective materiality of natural science.⁷⁶ But how does “living body” figure into this? Heidegger rarely speaks of the body, much less the “living body,” in his lectures. (Actually I have not noted any cases of it, but I may well have missed them.) Nevertheless, since life is spoken of so positively, one must assume “living body” has a positive sense as well; and here, then, correspondingly, *its* sense—body as *living human body in the world*—must also be such as is to be determined, like “nature as world,” in terms of *Dasein*. This, now, fits neatly with Heidegger’s point later in the lectures about the way facticity is “*one’s own*”—actually he says as “*our own*, as “*je unser eigenes Dasein*”—namely, as “made one’s own [*eingeeignet*], not be some “I-pole’s” specific act, but as what one performs in the course of one’s living being—not said this way in this passage, but more or less equivalently earlier in the text: “Existence as in every instance a determinate historical *possibility* is . . . never an ‘object’ but being [*Sein*]; existence is *there* only insofar as in each instance a life ‘is’ existence.”⁷⁷ (We also saw this earlier in his lectures on *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression* (GA 59).) And this is presumably what we could say about “living body”: a body is the living of *Dasein* inasmuch as it is an *existing* body.

Finally we have cannot overlook *Being and Time* nor the course of lectures in 1929-30 under the title *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, World, Finitude, Solitude* (GA 29/30); but again I must try

⁷⁴ GA 63, p. 31, 59

⁷⁵ Cf. GA 60p.

⁷⁶ One can find support for this in Heidegger’s discussion in GA 63 §8, p. 40, where he illustrates how “hermeneutical ascertainment” works by discussion how one explicates “the living *Dasein* [*das Lebensdasein*].”

⁷⁷ GA 63, p. 19.

to be as summary as possible. The question of life comes into *Being and Time* primarily in Heidegger's treatment of death and depends upon how life does or does not figure into the analysis of Dasein. Lived body [*Leib*] is touched upon much more briefly, and only a) in the treatment of *Zuhandenheit*—and allow me to leave this term untranslated (though I would render it “hand-readiness”)—and b) in relation to the distinction of existential spatiality from the spatiality of physical objects. In the texts on the first what is interesting is the way material substantiality implicitly plays a role in the fit of the hand to *Zuhandene* (e.g., gloves or hand movements) within the existentiality of Dasein; and in the text on existential spatiality, together with his rejection of any kind of “joining” of two orders—such as a “combining of spirit with a living body”—Heidegger's makes quite clear that there is a “spirit”-character to Dasein: “Because Dasein is ‘spiritual’ and only thereby can Dasein be spatial in a way that remains essentially impossible for an extended corporeal thing.”⁷⁸ If nothing else, it is clear that something about the traditional sense of “spirit” is akin to the Heideggerian thought about Dasein, if only because in some measure the latter is an interpretive radicalizing correction of “spirit,” in the mode of an existential-ontological transformation. This is far from a forswearing of “spirit.”

As for life, the half-dozen or so brief considerations of it in *Being and Time* cover a number of points. One such consideration sets aside all philosophical-anthropological notions of life—such as that of Dilthey and Bergson, even if credit is given to these and others for posing the question of life and marking out some points of validity.⁷⁹ The general limitation, however, is again simply that the proper frame for articulating the kind of being that is proper to human being was not realized by those thinkers.⁸⁰ What he says at the same time, however, is quite interesting. “Life is a kind of being of its own, but essentially only accessible in Dasein,” he writes. The ontology of life is done by way of a “privative interpretation; it determines what has to be so that something like just-being-alive is possible. Life is not pure *Vorhandensein* but it is not Dasein either.” And, Heidegger adds, Dasein is certainly not life as “just-being-alive” plus something else beyond that.⁸¹

⁷⁸ SZ, p. 368; my translation which happens to coincide largely with Joan Stambaugh's (*Being and Time*, New York: SUNY Press, 1968, p. 336.)

⁷⁹ SZ, p. 46-47.

⁸⁰ SZ, p. 49-50.

⁸¹ SZ, pp. 49-50. Stambaugh's translation, *Being and Time* p. 46, from which I take the neat formula “just-being-alive” for Heidegger's “Nur-noch-leben.” The same point is mentioned on SZ p. 194.

“Just-being-alive” cannot accordingly be the way Dasein meets its death in “going-out-of-the-world” to be Dasein no longer. There is a great difference between the end of a life and “ending in terms of Dasein [*des daseinsmäßigen Endens*].” The latter is anything but “physiological-biological” death and “medical” “exitus.” One has to understand life “as a kind of being to which an in-the-world-being belongs. This kind of being can only be settled ontologically in a privative orientation to Dasein. And Dasein allows being considered as pure life,” whereas taking a biological-physiological approach pushes Dasein into the realm of animal and plant being—presumably, then, “just-being-alive.”⁸² Everything in the ontological understanding of Dasein, then, depends upon making the ontology of life ordered to the prior ontology of Dasein, so that the existential analysis of death is made to accord with the way one characterizes Dasein’s basic constitution.⁸³ In sum, “the existential interpretation of life lies prior to all biology and ontology of life.”⁸⁴

The same general point holds for any conception of life as stretching between birth and death. Dasein does not follow and fill up the moments of actuality to comprise the sum-total of human experiences [*Erlebnissen*]. Dasein extends itself through its temporal passing in the unity of its being, in the existential integration worked as Dasein’s taking care of its being.⁸⁵ This is what makes for Dasein’s life, and the biological-physiological has to be interpreted in terms of this.

To put things this way, however central to Heidegger’s thinking it is, obviously leaves a lot of particulars rather indefinite. From 1919 on through *Being and Time* Heidegger goes no further in making things here more specifically clear, but, in the remarkable move he makes in his WS course of lectures in 1929-1930 he finally turns to life in more detail than anywhere else. Here he examines life precisely in humans and animals far beyond the contrast and distinction so far given between the existential life of Dasein on the one hand and on the other every other kind. “Just-being-alive” no longer suffices to

⁸² SZ, p. 246.

⁸³ This is an adaptation of Heidegger’s sentence on p. 247 in SZ: “Innerhalb der einer Ontologie des Lebens *vorgeordneten* Ontologie des Daseins ist wiederum die existenziale Analyse des Todes einer Charakteristik der Grundverfassung des Daseins *nachgeordnet*.” Emphasis Heidegger’s. Actually writes a sentence on the same p. 247 that is much the same as the paraphrase I offer here, but with the mediating place of the ontology of Dasein only implied: “Die existenziale Interpretation des Todes liegt vor aller Biologie und Ontologie des Lebens.”

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ This is a summation of the points Heidegger makes on p. 374 in SZ.

delineate the limitations of all life that is not Dasein. Animal life in particular is a way of being that approaches that of Dasein, even if it does so *deficiently*.

I shall have to be drastically selective in drawing out lessons from *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, as this course of lectures is called, limiting myself to what is directly relevant to the topic at issue, the question, namely, does determining what constitutes living being require that we move radically beyond the distinction between “nature” and “spirit,” or not? So far the work of Husserl and of Heidegger as well has not given us adequate reason to think it is necessary or even possible. Let me now, however, summarize as well as I can the elements that Heidegger here offers for their striking contrast to earlier work.

The three theses that in terms of which Heidegger proposes to work out his study are well known: “1) The stone (material) is *worldless*; 2) the animal is *poor in world*: 3) the human is *world-forming*.”⁸⁶ Now, the first thing to note—and it is apparent in the set of three theses—is that Heidegger, unlike in the tendency we’ve followed so far, places the main distinction, not between human and animal life, but between life in the living and the total absence of life in the lifeless; between a being that can die and an entity for which death is simply not a possibility.⁸⁷ Yet Heidegger has no inclination to opt for what some biology of his day proposed against “the tyranny of physics and chemistry,” namely, “vitalism.” That would be an equal mistake, seeking some mysterious force that physics cannot measure but which “explains” life.⁸⁸ No, Heidegger has another approach in mind, one that in fact follows from what we have seen him develop in his earlier writings, including *Being and Time*, namely, to consider animal life to see if one can “transpose” oneself into the animal’s life, not by pretending to “enter into” it, *as if* we were the animal, but “by going along with” this other being while remaining “oneself *as other*.” It is a question here, not of some kind of “empathy,” indeed, not of consciousness in any psychological sense at all, but of the analysis of *a different kind of existence*.⁸⁹

So, for example, take the idea of the living animal *as an organism*, as endowed with “organs,” that is, with *tools* at the disposal of . . . well, of *what* exactly? Both the animal and I see with our eyes and

⁸⁶ GA 29/30, p. 265. I shall largely follow the worthy English translation by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, modifying it occasionally (as in the present instance): Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of metaphysics, World, Finitude, Solitude*, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1994.

⁸⁷ GA 29/30, p. 265.

⁸⁸ GA 29/30, p. 297.

⁸⁹ GA 29/30, p. 298.

grab things with our front appendages (paws? hands?), but what kind of “instrumentality” is this, and is it instrumentality *at all*? The organs of sight and of paws or hands are not tools, but the realizations of *capacities*. Such capacities are the ways the organism maintains itself, guides itself, renews itself.⁹⁰ Organs arise and work in the organism in terms of “the way of being we call life.”⁹¹ And it is a unitary on-going system: organs and organism are a one, are a “*self*” in distinction from all around it as “not-it.”

Now, when with the last phrase I put things this way, expanding a little upon Heidegger’s more restricted framing when he first takes up the “selfhood” of the organism,⁹² I do so, not to provide something that Heidegger has left out, but to include already a structural element he provides a little later when he takes up the specific “poor world” of the animal. In the present passages he is simply pointing out the way the organ-capacities are the way the organism relates to itself in activations *for the sake of itself*.⁹³ “*To be organized is to be capable,*” Heidegger writes—and italicizes. This belongs “to the *essential being of life* [*zum Wesen des Lebens*].”⁹⁴ This said, Heidegger now considers the living being’s—the animal’s—*surround* [*Umgebung*]. This is where the pivotal analysis is offered that distinguishes the animal’s “poor world” for that of the human “world” as *formed by* the human, namely, in specifically focusing on the difference in the way the animal is involved in its surround and the way in which the human is. Yet in this, as I shall argue in the last section, one crucial element in the animal’s situation itself gets left aside.

For now, let us simply note how Heidegger finds the animal to be absorbed not so much in its surround, or anything in it, but rather in its own system of *drives*; the animal is absorbed *in itself*, but without *reflective* thematization; it is a matter of the animal’s being held in the sway of its drives.⁹⁵ This self-absorption is what restricts the manner in which things in its surround can be related to and taken up in the animal’s behavior. There is, therefore, a seeing of the seen, a hearing of the heard, and a capturing of the prey, but the *relationality* [*Bezogenheit* is Heidegger’s word] of such seeing, hearing,

⁹⁰ GA 29/30, §53.

⁹¹ GA 29/30, p. 329.

⁹² GA 29/30, p. 332.

⁹³ GA 29/30, §§54-56.

⁹⁴ GA 29/30, p. 343.

⁹⁵ GA 23/30, §58. Heidegger works here in an analysis based on the interlocking and differentiating usages of conjugational forms of the German verb *nehmen* and of variants built up from it.

and capturing is always motivated by, held by, and restricted by the animal's drives; what is seen or heard or captured is never "*present [vorhanden]*" as itself for the animal, or indeed "present" as anything—as seen or heard or captured.⁹⁶ Heidegger puts it succinctly this way: "There is no apprehending (*Vernehmung*), but only a *behaving [Benehmen]* here,⁹⁷ a driven activity [*Treiben*] which we construe in this way because the possibility of taking something as something is *withheld [genommen]* from the animal—and not just here and now, but withheld in the sense that such a possibility is 'not given at all'."⁹⁸ For this to work such that the animal's "surround" is a *kind of* "world" Heidegger finds a countermove in play that, as it were, loosens the governance by drives in what he terms "disinhibition [*Enthemmung*]." For the animal by its very constitution as a whole of "*capability [Fähigsein]*," not as a mere physical system of forces but as an *organization*. (a being integratively constituted with capacities for "behaving," namely, *organs*), is *ipso facto*—by essence—*bound to a surround*. In this the animal *surrounds itself* with what is around it; and this is how the factor of "disinhibition" is constitutively co-essential with the animal's drive-bound limitations.⁹⁹ In this way, then, the animal both "has a world and does not have a world."¹⁰⁰ Put another way, the animal has a "poor" engagement with the

⁹⁶ GA 29/30, §59.

⁹⁷ Actually Heidegger tries to assign *sich benehmen* (noun: *Benehmen*) to animals as "behave" ("behavior") and *sich verhalten* (noun: *Verhaltung*) to humans as "comportment" (GA 29/30, §58 a. and thereafter; these renderings are those of McNeill and Walker in their translation), with the difference between them being that between a drive-governed aim at something in the surround and a genuine "openness" the thing in its being in the world. It is debatable if this kind of lexical differentiation can be made on the basis of the history of the word, especially since "behave" in English, given its sense as a development from combining "be-" with "have" and used in the reflexive, if the *Oxford English Dictionary* is any kind of reliable resource here, is very much like that of an outdated cognate German word *sich behaben*, which is more or less synonymous with *sich benehmen*. Of course it is actual current usage—or at least that of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century—that would be the basis for any such distinction, if the connotations tend toward such a difference, which may or may not reflect philological word origination.

⁹⁸ GA 29/30, p. 360 (*Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, p. 247, translation slightly modified).

⁹⁹ GA 29/30, §61 a).

¹⁰⁰ GA 29/30, p. 390: "Im Tier ist ein *Haben von Welt* und ein *Nichthaben von Welt*." (Heidegger's emphasis.)

world, one that is not the full “openness” that humans constitutively possess but rather simply “an access to . . . in the sense of its instinctually driven behavior [*in Sinne des triebhaften Benehmens*].”¹⁰¹

This is almost all we need, now, to return to the main issue I proposed at the beginning, namely, how Husserl and Heidegger work, in their defining of “life,” with respect to the dichotomy of “nature and spirit.” There are still a couple of points in Heidegger’s long treatment in this 1929-1930 lectures on “The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics” that I want to review. Among these I shall not include the idea of human being as “world-forming”—to which, incidentally, the animal’s *Sich-umringen*: its “ringing-itself with its surround,” if I may put the expression periphrastically, is not entirely without analogy; nor do I wish to deal with the distinction between “Dasein” and “human being,” even though I find Heidegger distinguishing the two in a small but significant way.¹⁰² What is the kind of point I wish to raise is in the first place Heidegger’s remark, in the context of such matters as “world-forming” and Dasein, that reinterprets *nature itself*. In §66 in keeping his focus on the kind of being that is *living being* is, Heidegger is led to note that animal life, in the way the encircling surrounds of different animals intersect and come into interplay—Heidegger’s word is “enmeshing [*Verzahnung*]”—generates an “animal realm” that “holds sway” in a quite specific way “in the whole of nature and of that-which-is as such [*im Ganzen der Natur und des Seienden überhaupt*].”¹⁰³ Here the living being itself “adapts for itself something from nature itself into its own encircling surround [*in seinen Umring*].” This makes it necessary to recognize in this intersecting interplay of animals and their surrounds that there is an “*intrinsic dominion character on the part of the living being within that-which-is in general*, an intrinsic elevation of nature over itself, a superiority that is lived in life itself.”¹⁰⁴ Nature under this insight, Heidegger goes on to write, in being considered in terms of neither the lifeless nor the living, is no longer at all adequately construed if it is conceived as the base-level floor upon which humanness would be constructed as a higher stratum of being and doing which thereby would go on in

¹⁰¹ GA 2./30, p. 391 (*Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, p. 269). The ellipsis is in the German, meaning a “whatever” coming after the preposition “to.”

¹⁰² See GA 29/30, p. 414: “Der Mensch qua Mensch ist weltbildend, das heißt nicht der Mensch, so, wie er auf der Straße herumläuft, sondern das *Da-sein im Menschen* ist weltbildend.“

¹⁰³ GA 29/30, p. 402.

¹⁰⁴ GA 29/30, p. 403, italics Heidegger’s. The final phrase here is “eine innere, im Leben selbst gelebte Erhabenheit der Natur über sich selbst.” Heidegger avoids for his analyses using *erleben*, in contrast to Husserl.

total chaos as to what it is supposed to be and do.¹⁰⁵ Human being instead has to be considered in terms of having *its* place and role in this same realm of interactive, interplaying surrounds, but in radical difference from the living animal's drive-governed yet self-disinhibiting behavior-to-and-in-a milieu. "The human being exists in a way all its own *within* that-which-is [*in eigentümlicher Weise* inmit-ten *des Seienden*]." And this phrase, "within that-which-is," means "living nature holds us ourselves as human being captive in a quite specific way, not on the basis of any particular influence or impression that living nature exerts on us, but from out of our essential being [*Wesen*], whether we learn of [*er-fahren*] that essential being in an original-level relationship [*ursprünglichen Verhältnis*] or not."¹⁰⁶ This, then, is where the clarification begins that Heidegger spends the rest of the lectures providing, namely, on how human being, by virtue of the dynamic of Dasein, the kind of being that every human has, "forms [*bildet*]" the world "as the manifestness [*Offenbarkeit*] of that-which-is as such as a whole."¹⁰⁷

There is one final point, now, that has to be brought in here, similarly emphasizing a distinction between the human and the animal regarding an element figuring differently in both the surround/milieu

¹⁰⁵ Heidegger's sentence, which I paraphrase here in light of the whole context, especially considering the way nature is spoken of as Heidegger goes on, is written thus: "So ist die Natur – weder die leblose noch gar die lebendige – keineswegs das Brett und die unterste Schicht, auf der das Menschenwesen aufgeschichtet wäre, um darauf sein Unwesen zu treiben." (GA 29/30 p. 403) In actual fact this sentence could be read differently, as McNeill and Walker do in their translation, to mean: it doesn't make any difference whether one takes inanimate or animate nature, it is in neither case the "plank or lesser rung of the ladder which human being would ascend, thus to assert his strange essence." There is a rich connotative meaning in '*Unwesen*,' especially when used in the expression '*sein Unwesen treiben*' as the "business" pursued by the here derided conception of a "higher-stratum" *Menschenwesen*. McNeill and Walker focus on the "-wesen" element of '*Unwesen*' in their rendering of '*sein Unwesen treiben*' but the ordinary sense of this expression ("wreak havoc") also needs also to be in play.

¹⁰⁶ GA 29/30, p. 403-404, translation adapted somewhat from *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, p. 278. One should not overlook the way the "relationship"—*Verhältnis*—that is to be in play here is lexically related to *Verhalten*, behavior/comportment/bearing, given the way Heidegger contrasts the human with the animal. At the same time, one has to take it in linkable with the *kind of cognition* to be methodically gained, about human-being/Dasein's "world-formation," that Heidegger spends time and care on to analyze and delineate (specifically in terms of "formal indication) in the treatment from §69 virtually to the end of the lectures.

¹⁰⁷ Formulations based respectively on GA 20/30 in §68, pp. 414 and 412 (translation modeled after *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, §68).

and the world of that-which-is—that is, in the animal “poor world” and in the “humanly-formed” world. In each way of having “world,” animal or human, and however much one can speak of a “forming” of the world that one somehow grasps in an entry and regression by the thinker “into the Dasein in the human,”¹⁰⁸ “what the world is, precisely insofar as its essential being [*Wesen*] resides in what we shall name the world’s *prevailing*, which is something more original than anything in being that imposes itself [*alles sich aufdrängende Seiende*]” *remains forever distant from us.*”¹⁰⁹ In sum, however much the idea of Dasein’s “world-forming” lies at the center of the whole analytic of Dasein, *we cannot actually and in principle get to the* origination of the world as a moment in which all that is at work for that origination *lies there* clear to us in its elements and functions. What this whole analytic of Dasein displays is an exercise in “formal indication,” and I use this expression precisely as a methodological place-holder for what Heidegger envisaged as the project of fundamental ontology, but which was actually and in principle never to be completed. One can only *prepare* for that ultimate insight, but one can never *effectuate* it.¹¹⁰

4. Comparison and Concluding Proposals

I think we have enough here in the two studies just offered that, even if they are in broad strokes with only selected detail, allow us to draw some concluding proposals from these two extensive bodies of material. I wish to make these proposals in the form of a couple of preliminary interpretation-like theses—preliminary in that I wish to test, both in my own further reading and in discussions such as we may hold here, what I am thus led to from the above studies. There are only two, but each one embraces a number of component ascertainties.

A. *Tendencies to stay within and tendencies to move beyond the Nature-Spirit dichotomy*

It is clear to me that in the work of both Husserl and Heidegger the fact that each works in such a way as to be free from the kind of naturalism that takes in-itself physicalist materiality as the primary

¹⁰⁸ See footnote 102, where this sentence is quoted from GA 29/30, p. 414.

¹⁰⁹ GA 29/30, pp. 509-510, translation adapted from *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, p. 351

¹¹⁰ Here is Heidegger’s way of putting this in §74, GA 29/30, p. 510: “Die Weckung der Grundstimmung im ersten Teil der Vorlesung sowohl wie der zuletzt vollzogen Rückgang von der *λόγος*-Struktur in das Grundgeschehen dienen beide dem einen: *vorzubereiten das Eingehen in das Geschehen des Waltens der Welt*. Dieser philosophierende Ein- und Rückgang des Menschen in das Dasein in ihm kann immer nur vorbereitet, nie erwirkt werden.”

determinant for all reality, opens up *some measure of possibility* for moving beyond the classic distinction between nature and spirit. It is also clear, however, that each works to no small extent within the *allowing* of the physicalist-material conception of nature to stand: that is what the natural sciences assume nature to be, so that is what Husserl and Heidegger have to work from—and in this case wholly *against*. Yet both of them, Husserl and Heidegger alike, entertain considerations that suggest principles by which one does not need to accept the physicalist-material conception of nature as final and ultimate, but can develop another conception that moves beyond it. At the same time, however, in the majority of their writings Husserl and Heidegger in their analyses—Husserl, of human experience in terms of its transcendental constitutive-origivative core, Heidegger, of human being in terms of its existential way of being termed Dasein—tend to work out these out primarily in a framework that can only be called *geistig*, of *spirit*, rather than in any way *natürlich*, of *nature*. The experiential thematic achievement that Husserl aims to develop as *transcendental* in its ambit, dignity, and character is clearly *geistig*—and is spoken of in its proper sense through the use of such *geistig* terms as consciousness,¹¹¹ cognition, and person; and the “foundedness”-relation, in particular in *Ideas II*, reinforces the autonomy of the level of “spirit” in human constitution. There is one glaring exception to this, when Husserl, in his *Nature und Geist* lectures, writes of a non-*exclusiveness* of realm with regard to the other: “Nature has also spirit-determinations, spirit has also nature-determinations.”¹¹² But in the end, these realms come together not by being radically recast and integrated, but by being unified, more or less as they have been already conceived, in the origivative constitution that is disclosed primarily on the “spirit”-side. Heidegger’s Dasein, in turn, certainly seems to be *geistig* in its operations¹¹³ (albeit in radicalized form) especially in the reaching of self-recognition as Dasein in the fullness of its constitutive structure

¹¹¹ One should note, however, that the word “consciousness” does not have all that long a history in the philosophic sense. The English *consciousness* came into usage in the 17th century in its current sense of awareness as of an active interior, especially as awareness explicitly of oneself, while the German *Bewußtsein* was coined for the same sense in the 18th. The French *conscience*, finally taking on this same sense in the course of the 18th century, never did develop a separate word for it, retaining *conscience* for both consciousness and conscience (which in German is *das Gewissen*).

¹¹² See above, p. 12, the quotation from Hua XXXII, p. 16.

¹¹³ See p. 30 above where a quotation to this effect from SZ, p. 368 is given.

and operation—an achievement that is a structural feature of Dasein itself.¹¹⁴ Yet in the last of his analyses of Dasein in 1929-1930 Heidegger, as we have just seen, decidedly offers a reconsideration of nature precisely on the basis of the at least analogous standing of the animal and the human in regard to the kinds of “world” with which they are each differently but with equal binding constitutively engaged.

The treatment of nature that Heidegger offers in this lecture course does something in *his* project that Husserl did not get to or work out in his own. Heidegger discovers that nature could be understood *non-univocally* in its sense, and at the same time without rigid adherence to the nature-spirit divide; and the pivotal “region” in which this transcending of deeply set philosophic divisions is disclosed is the phenomenon of *life*, more specifically, the constitution and capability structure of *living being*. Here nature embraces us in and is embraced by our human capability in terms of *a structural* element of nature *other than* the physical-mechanical, namely, in terms of the structure and rule of *the world* in the living of the animal and the human, specifically in the measure of the kind of *accessibility* each enjoys to what is experientially in the world..

Heidegger opens up this possibility of mitigating, if not going beyond the nature-spirit divide, but so far as I know never returned to it and doesn’t offer further consideration on the point. If it is a valid possibility, it is left to be taken up and pursued by others. Yet to do that, the opening needs to be *augmented*. It is not yet adequate. To see why, let us turn for a moment to the way Husserl touches upon a similar possibility in *Ideas II*, namely, in explicating the role of bodily kinesthetics and of aesthetics in general in living-bodily experiencing. Husserl focuses on the role of sense-perceptual, qualitative features regarding both one’s own being and that which we find in the world. What is central for Husserl is the strict correlation—which I would better put as the bonded singleness—of a) the intentional “of” and b) the “to” of appearance: what manifestly appears simply *is* what is sensed actually in perception. Husserl is concerned with the *phenomenal manifestness* of the actual. It is here that he might have looked further into the *materiality* of sensing wherein the sense-qualities that are ipso facto *together* the very capability-modes of the senses *and* the appearance possibilities of actualities in the world—and that this Fact is a factor *in and of nature*. If *this* is how human being in its bodily actuality is concretely intentionally capable, then the “spirit” in human being—or mutatis mutandis, the transcendental—if it

¹¹⁴ This is already asserted in GA 63, p. 15, for example: “The understanding that arises in interpretation is . . . a *how* of Dasein itself.” (Translation by John van Buren, Heidegger, *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999.)

is an constitutively integrated living being—is itself *something of nature*. And in this case nature is a transcendental element.¹¹⁵ Husserl, however, never took this up, even in the “Crisis”-texts, however much it is implicit there.¹¹⁶

Heidegger, now, leaves manifest appearing unconsidered in its sense-qualitative dimensions. In his strictly existential-ontological analytic aim, there is seemingly no real role for sense-experience in the understanding of the existential structure and functions of Dasein. Yet it is simply not possible for existential structures to be either concrete in their role and operation or—what amounts to the same thing—to be actually engaged in the world concretely, *without* sense-experience. Moreover, it is impossible for fundamental ontological insight—in “formal indication”—to function concretely *without the phenomenal*, which of course means without perceptual experience. To put this another way: just as in Heidegger’s early work from 1919 to 1928 the factic existence of human being could only be concrete *as living*, so Dasein can only be concrete *as sense-experiential* in its factic existential concreteness. Dasein without living being and experience is simply an abstraction—*exactly like absolute Geist*.

What this suggests, now, is that a phenomenological analysis of human being precisely as naturally in the world in its full dimensions, i.e., as explicated beyond the way the framework for doing so is governed by the nature-spirit division, has to be both phenomenological and existential-ontological.¹¹⁷

B. The materiality of nature

If nature is thus not adequately intelligible in terms of the traditional nature-spirit dichotomy, then obviously neither is spirit thus adequately intelligible. Would this mean, then, that spirit has to be re-considered as much as nature does? Does this mean that, if we take Heidegger’s transposition of nature in terms of the meaning of *world* in his existential-ontological analysis of the Dasein of human being as a certain converting of nature into something as it were *geistig*, spirit then would have to be converted into something as it were *natürlich*? And what could that be?

¹¹⁵ One could add here that something of this begins to show in Husserl’s C-manuscripts (Edmund Husserl, *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929-1934)*, ed. by Dieter Lohmar, Husserliana Materialien VIII, Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), but that is another whole issue.

¹¹⁶ But Maurice Merleau-Ponty does just this; but to take that up too goes beyond the scope of the present contribution.

¹¹⁷ To put it another way, one has to approach human being as “*Geist in der Welt*,” to borrow the title of the published dissertation by one of Heidegger’s famous students, Karl Rahner.

Here, the one thing that is all-important to realize is that the entire realm that both Husserl and Heidegger are working within is the realm of *the meaningful*, not the realm of the objectified physical-mechanical. Or to put things more correctly: the only way any science or cognitive inquiry can approach its subject-matter is in terms of the way things are actually experienced, that is to say, given, found, accessible in some meaningful manner, as *making sense* in that experience, however direct or indirect it may be. (And there is no small measure of the indirect in both Husserl's and Heidegger's investigations). Whatever the framing one may give to what one wishes to discover in its fundamental structure and actions, whether it be abstractly conceptual, methodologically hermeneutic, or scientifically observed and asserted in an independence from human whims or motivations, that which one deals with is taken *in its meaningful experiential accessibility* and in the meaningful *expression* that articulates that experiential sense.¹¹⁸

To see two cats is to grasp in vision meaningful animate entities in my surroundings. To train two cats is to work with the animals' capacities and tendencies to direct them in some way satisfactory to their meaningful place in my life (although might it not also be that for certain animals I find a satisfactory, and *meaningful*, place in theirs?). To talk about my cats is to adjust what I say to what the cats actually do so that I really does speak of their behaviors. In each of these ways of dealing with what I find in the world the meaningfulness in play is not a mechanical interplay of causal forces, but an interplay of elements of *sense*. It is how things cohere *in sense* that makes what I see comprehensible, that makes what I do have a point and, and that makes what I say be true or not. (This point, by the way, is not only intrinsic to Husserl's and Heidegger's work, but is straight Dilthey as well.)

Now, the issue in the present consideration is this: Is the grasp of being and realities in terms of senses and meaningfulness, is the work of experience getting things as they are manifest, as I deal with them, and as I thereupon can speak about them—is all this an occurrence *in nature*? And this reverts to

¹¹⁸ One point in this that perhaps needs alternate formulation is this: To say that nature as physical science deals with it is a construal of nature as “physical-mechanical” is too limiting for representing the whole field of natural scientific investigations. Theoretical physics, for example, does not deal with the stuff-like “physical” nor with force-transmission as simply mechanical. Both sub-atomic physics and cosmological relativity theory are far more sophisticated than that, treating phenomena in terms of all kinds of abstractions in mathematical expression. Even so, not only is all that a procedure in the realm of meanings, the verification of any such theories always comes back to the experimental and observable, i.e., the *experientially given* precisely as meaningfully given and formulated.

the consideration I was drawing from Heidegger's 1929-30 lectures, namely, that human being's existence in the world, in the midst of all-that-is, with a conception that recasts nature beyond the scientific construal into the phenomenological or ontological—and beyond strict adherence to the nature-spirit divide—finds nature as a governing factor that is manifest in the world as influencing and impressing itself on living beings including myself *in terms of world-meaningfulness*; for that is how we experience it, out of our own capacities.¹¹⁹ Another way of putting this is to say that the openness of the world is the opening of *the field of sense* as the indispensable horizon for something to be there for oneself as being, living, and acting in the same “there.”¹²⁰

Now, without wishing at all to suggest that even the most arcane abstraction, whether in mathematics or in highly speculative philosophizing, is material like the mechanical interplay of forces (or like the processes that are formulated mathematically in terms of field- or vector-equations), what I do wish to suggest is that, to the extent that intuitional sensible qualitative differentiations are intrinsic to the display of form in diagrams or to the linguistic articulation of concepts—e.g., that lines and their configurations matter for the mathematical understanding; of that the natural language sense of concepts matters for understanding those concepts—the sense of those diagrams and of those linguistic expressions *is natural and material*. Again, this is not to make them physical mechanisms, but it is to make them grounded in *lived bodily doings*—*Erlebnisse* if one accepts Husserl's usage, *Erfahrungen* if one follows Heidegger, and in either case *Vollzug: a doing one undergoes in its being done* inasmuch as the *sense* of it as it goes on is what one is aware of as it is done—its *Vollzugssinn*, its sense-in-being-done. This is an insight that Heidegger in effect tries to lay out for us, and its one that is embedded in Husserl's work, although not all that much directly explicated. (Truth be told, it is Eugen Fink who gives it its explicit formulation in Husserlian phenomenology; whence Merleau-Ponty was struck by its power in phenomenology. But that is another story.)

What I am suggesting is that, especially in lived kinesthetic sense—direction, force, configuration in motion, distance, extension, penetration, integration in action, weight, energy, inertia, mass, resistance, division, to name some features—it is the very *sense* of materiality that is being got, and got pre-

¹¹⁹ Again these are the ideas in GA 29/30, §66.

¹²⁰ Not to mention that, phenomenologically and ontologically speaking, this *Vollzugssinn* and its erupting within and with the field of sense is contributory to the very force and fundamentality of *εμπειρία: empeiria* as such, the field of the empirical and of the exercise of resort to it for the sake of knowing, in other words, the field that makes empirical and theoretical science possible.

cisely *as the sense of oneself* as material in one's dealing with the material non-self other. We know materiality because we *live* it, in our milieu. What could be more *of nature*? And at the same time *of spirit*—for what is happening here is the materialization of “spirit,” not by reducing it to energy interplay in physicalist-mechanical matter, but by finding factors in “spirit” that are living-bodily, *leiblich*, in their actual concreteness, in contrast to the kind of single-level abstract conceptualization that has “spirit” as autonomous pure intellect.

The question of the autonomy of powers such as that of intellect—and of meanings for such powers, e.g., as in logic and mathematics, to bring in one of Husserl's major themes—is a huge one, but I shall have to leave it aside here. Nonetheless, relevant to the present point are the considerations raised in my far too summary treatment of Husserl's *Ideas II*, regarding the kinesthetic sense, the felt awareness, of what one is doing right in the going-on of one's being and acting, the *Vollzugsbewußtsein* (“performance-consciousness”) that is deep within Husserl's investigations even if he does not name it such.¹²¹ However, it is a kind of this “performance-consciousness” in living being that Husserl describes in *Ideas II*, namely, the kinesthetic sense fundamental to the living/lived body.¹²² This is also the kind of “consciousness” operating in the fundamental dynamic of temporalization, again to be seen at various points in Husserl's analyses of temporality;¹²³ but, I'm afraid, that too is for another occasion.

¹²¹ This is also one of the elements in Husserl's work that Eugen Fink draws out for highlighting as a fundamental element, what he spoke of as “*eine ermöglichende Synusie von Seiendem und Wissen*,” one form of which is “*ein alle Erkenntnisarten betreffenden Vollzugscharakter*,” in his 1939 article, “Das Problem der Phänomenologie Husserls,” *Revue internationale de philosophie*, I, pp. 177-223, and reprinted in Fink's *Studien zur Phänomenologie* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 179-223; specific mention on p. 209. Pertaining to this as well there is his first notice of the *fungierende Intentionalität* in Husserl's work (*Studien*, p. 222). I should mention to that Fink terms the felt kinesthetic sense spoken of here, especially if taken in a generalized way, “pathic,” to contrast it on the one hand to the way the “feeling” is generally used and meant, especially in the plural as “feelings,” and on the other to explicit reflection, generally assumed to be more “intellectual” in character—a construal obviously worth taking up for reassessment.

¹²² See above, pp. 8-9.

¹²³ Some of the most significant contributions Fink made to Husserl's time-studies are on this very point, but unfortunately they are only indicated in Fink's notes from the Husserl years, now slowly beginning to come into print in the Eugen Fink.Gesamtausgabe, volumes 3.1-.4.

For the present, however, we see here how one feature of what I see in Heidegger's work as a possible opening to the reconsideration of "nature and spirit" needs supplementation in the realm of sense-experience from Husserl, even if the latter certainly needs Heidegger's analyses as well. Let me, however, suggest one last implication of this infusion of a phenomenology of sense into Heidegger's fundamental ontology, especially in view of his analysis of animal and human worlds. If the world concretely taken is the field of sense and the taking of the world as the manifestness-in-sense-and-for-sense of that-which-is, then it is only be out of (or *within*, if one prefers) lived/living bodily sense-experience that there can be a sense of being (*Seinssinn*, *Sinn des Seins*), that is, as sense of being itself (*Sein*) as the *non-manifest* such that it is got *via* that which can be and is manifest—a situation of non-directness, of non-presence that is emphasized repeatedly in *Being and Time* and the works that continue its problematic.

This is not the end, but here is where I shall have to stop, leaving these and other implications of this whole proposal for other occasions.